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The Reporter has chosen to publish a transcript of a symposium held at Brooklyn Law School in
April, 1986, entitled Lesbians, Gays, and Feminists at the Bar: Translating Personal Experience into
Effective Legal Argument. The idea for this symposium originated in discussions among the men-
bers of the Brooklyn Law School Lesbian and Gay Law Student Association during the 1985-86
school year. It was designed to explore two- issues: confronting, within the context of litigation,
issues of sex, sexuality and gender; and incorporating personal experience into effective legal argu-
ments and strategies.
Briefly restated, the comments centered upon the notion that the practice of law is not devoid of
human experience, perception or feeling. As a lawyer, one's personal experience is inextricably
linked with one's legal analysis, and discovering and cultivating that connection enhances one's
understanding of her client and the client's needs. One's experiences affect how a legal argument is
shaped and delivered or discarded.
Much of what follows is the transcription of extemporaneous comments, none of which the par-
ticipants ever contemplated would appear in written form. We edited lightly, to maintain the unique
flavor of each speaker's original comments. Although footnotes have been added in some places,
this has been done primarily for the reader's information and convenience. Hence, such footnotes
are not meant to be exhaustive with respect to the propositions that they support.
By publishing this exploration of the process by which individuals translate personal experience
into effective legal argument, the Reporter's intention is to encourage the reader to consider this
process in her or his own practice. This might also stimulate more discussion of this issue and
possibly encourage similar symposia.
The event, attended by about forty people, was held in the Moot Court Room of Brooklyn Law
School. After an introduction of the speakers and a short exercise in "gendering", four people
spoke about confronting sex, sexuality and gender in their practice and their views about translating
their own personal experience into effective legal argument. The speakers were each chosen for the
integration of their personal experience into their own specific areas of interest to themselves. A
conscious decision was made to include men in order to get a range of perspectives, and not treat
this approach as something it is not: an entirely "female" approach to practicing law. After each of
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the speakers delivered his or her comments, and then a short break, both the speakers and the
audience discussed some issues raised by the speakers.
The sponsor of this event, the Brooklyn Law School Lesbian and Gay Law Student Association,
wishes to acknowledge the financial support of their friends and colleagues in other Brooklyn Law
School student organizations, without which the symposium could not have been a reality: the Na-
tional Lawyers Guild, the Black Law Student Association, the Hispanic Law Student Association, and
the Legal Association of Women (LAW).
ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER:
This workshop, entitled Lesbians, Gays and
Feminists at the Bar.- Translating Personal Expe-
rience into Effective Legal Argument, is intended
to explore ways in which lawyers have translated
personal experience into effective legal arguments
and strategies. My name is Liz Schneider. I am
a professor of law at Brooklyn Law School, for-
merly a litigator at the Center for Constitutional
Rights in New York City, and a former staff at-
torney at the Constitutional Litigation Clinic at
Rutgers Law School-Newark. I am pleased to
be moderator for this workshop as well as one of
the panelists. I will introduce you to the rest of
our panelists and give you an idea of our program
for today.
First, Michael Lavery, who's sitting next to
me, is a private practitioner in New York City.
He's a founder of LAMBDA Legal Defense and
Education Fund and continues to work with
LAMBDA as a cooperating attorney. He has
represented gay and lesbian clients in a number of
important cases in a number of areas. In In the
Matter of Robert Paul P.,' a case decided in the
New York Court of Appeals in 1983, he repre-
sented two adult males, one of whom wanted to
adopt the other. In that case, which I suspect he's
probably going to talk about today, the New York
Court of Appeals held that the adoption statutes
did not apply to such a relationship.
Next, Mary Dunlap, who is sitting next to
Michael Lavery, is a private practitioner and law
teacher in San Francisco. Mary is also a long-
standing colleague of mine, someone with whom
I've worked and felt a close connection for many
years. She has taught sex discrimination, lesbian
and gay rights and civil trial practice. In the
1970's she was a founder of Equal Rights Advo-
cate, Inc., which is a public interest law firm de-
voted to sex discrimination law in San Francisco.
She is now in private practice and her caseload
has a heavy emphasis on issues of sex discrimina-
tion and gay and lesbian rights. She has written
on many topics and has written some very impor-
tant groundbreaking articles. Most recently, she
is the author of the chapter on employment, and
co-author of the chapter on the First Amend-
ment, for the National Lawyers Guild and Clark
Boardman publication, Sexual Orientation and
the Law,2 which is a volume many of you are
probably familiar with, and if not, should-be.
John DeWitt Gregory is a dean at the Hof-
stra University Law School where he teaches
criminal law- and domestic relations. He was di-
rector and general counsel of Community Action
for Legal Services (CALS) from 1967 to 1971 and
has had extensive appellate court experience. He
has served on the Board of Directors of the New
York Civil Liberties Union for many years and
also continues to be active with the LAMBDA
Legal Defense-and Education Fund.
This workshop has a format that reflects its
purpose, namely, the desire to move beyond the
law as something abstract. Mary Dunlap is going
to start us off today with some group work in con-
sciousness-raising that will help us reveal our own
perceptions of gender and how our perceptions of
gender shape our view of the world. We think
that this exercise will give us some concrete expe-
rience that will provide a basis for, and then
strengthen and reinforce, our discussion. After
this preliminary session, we will have brief
presentations by the four panelists on our own
perspectives on the topic. We will try to focus on
the ways in which our own personal experience
and our own experience of the world politically
has shaped our views of litigation strategy, and
the ways in which we have translated that experi-
ence as lawyers. We'll take a short break at that
point and then open the program up to discus-
1. Matter of Robert Paul P., 97 A.D.2d 991, 469 N.Y.S.2d
833 (App. Div. 1983).
2. M. Dunlap, Employment and First Amendment in
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW §§ 5.01-5.07, §§ 9.01-
9.03 (R. Achtenberg ed. 1985).
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sion, dialogue, and conversation among all of
us-audience and panel together.
MARY DUNLAP:
Thank you, Liz. I especially like the part
about us being colleagues. It really, really feels
good to reinforce Liz's and my connection. We
meet each other at conferences and every once in
a while we end up having a little social time to-
gether too, which is really very nice. Most of the
time we just do this kind of work. I've become
convinced that we do what we do as well as we do
it in part because we make connections that are
stronger than the conceptual. The connections
between Liz's work and mine are more than con-
ceptual. Her work has been vital in defending
women who fight back, getting courts and juries
to realize that Yvonne Wanrow3 and others like
her are in a different position because of their gen-
der when it comes to issues of violence and
threats to their children and their lives. It's a
kind of work that has a personal dimension or a
whole array of personal dimensions that are unde-
niable if you pay any kind of attention to it, be-
yond looking at cases and finding victims and
playing the legal game. I don't mean, by referring
to "playing the legal game," to put the law down,
but I do mean that it is a game with political
rules, and the rules are being changed. One of the
ways we're trying to change the rules in our life-
times is by making the law responsive not just to
"humanity," but to the human personality. And
I think that's part of what we want to do today.
I have this idea, and it's an invitation that I
want to make to you, that we can engage in what
amounts to an exercise. The exercise works
pretty well for loosening up our inhibitions.
What I mean by that are inhibitions about dis-
cussing gender, sexism, homophobia and all these
kinds of issues in a personal, up-front, "this hap-
pened to me," "this is my life," way. This exer-
cise is a sort of general way to do that.
These are five doodles or drawings that came
to me in a sort of burst of hieroglyphic enthusi-
asm about a year ago when I was first preparing
for a workshop like this one. The challenge,
speaking in terms of these drawings, is to sex
them. I ask you to write down according to the
number on the drawing, what sex, gender, sexual
orientation it represents, or you can package all
those three issues together. What comes to your
mind or your awareness when you look at these
drawings?*
I was kidding around a little bit right before
we started and I covered up the right half of my
page and I said those were the answers. There are
no right answers in this exercise. This is one of
those rare cases where you're going to put pencil
to paper and. not have any confidence that the an-
swer you come up with is right. There are no
right answers. Instead, this is an effort to test
some preconceptions and some patterning and
conditioning we have about the shapes of genders.
And so, let me ask you first of all, if you'd be will-
ing to take the paper that's hopefully traveling
around and making itself available to you. Just
number it one through five and then write down
your impressions of the genders, sexual orienta-
tions, sexes and maybe even the sexinesses of
these five illustrations, and I won't interrupt you.
In fact I'll do the exercise myself.
All right. This feels a little bit like "do not
turn the page of this test booklet until you are
told to do so." (Laughter) Remember that experi-
3. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
* Following are the five doodles used by Ms. Dunlap; read-





ence in school testing? It all came back to me in a
flash. How many people here found this difficult
to do? Most of you. Me too.
How many people here in the course of lis-
tening to me describe the exercise thought, "What
the hell has this got to do with law"? (Laughter)
This circle of people whose hands went up, I
think they're honest. You have had an entirely
natural, expected, legitimate reaction to my draw-
ing five silly figures on the board and asking you
to gender them. Is this a workshop on translating
personal experience into effective legal argument
on subjects of gender and sexual orientation?




Ah, yes, California. (Laughter) True, I may
be forced to my defenses before I really have a
chance to put them together. I'm really not from
California, it's all a spoof. I'm really from the
planet Mars. (Laughter)
Okay. Put this little piece of paper aside.
And if you only have one piece of paper, tear it in
half because you're going to need another little
piece about that size for the other half. Just set
aside that sheet.
What I'm going to ask Christina Clarke, if
you'd be willing, Christina, is go through there
and pick out two or three fascinating answers,
and after we're done with the tallying, we'll pro-
vide some feedback on our impressions of this ex-
ercise. Less important than what anyone said
about all these symbols is that we went through
that step.
There's a sort of progressive model going on
here, which is what got us at least a little more
comfortable with the idea of having some kind of
personal reaction in the confines of a sort of gladi-
atorial classroom. Notice how you're sitting.
Notice the structure of the room. Notice the way
in which ideas will be presented. They're not go-
ing to be presented in a way that engages every-
one in the circle. They're going to be presented in
a way that puts you in rows. I am cognizant that
this is a good program. That is part of what we're
working on here, not just the architectural but the
interpersonal structuring of our interactions.
Nothing is taken for granted in that re-structur-
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ing. You're sitting so that, at most, you can look
at maybe people next to you in your row and the
backs of the heads of the people in front of you.
That makes the other part of the exercise more
difficult. So at some juncture I may ask you to
turn around and look at each other. We're going
to make the most of our flexibility. Now I want
you to keep in mind the effect that this environ-
ment is having on the dialogue. The focus that
you have on me is partly a function of not being
able to be distracted by taking each other in.
So what's the challenge here? Primarily, I
am putting together personal experience with ef-
fective advocacy. I am relating the personal to
the act of putting together the "compelling argu-
ment." Having the personal experience or the in-
sight that organizes the case, one reaches the
court.
I thought about the title of this symposium.
I thought it was a great way to express what those
people who organized this conference were trying
to do. I got to thinking about that as a challenge.
I like the way it was phrased, "translating per-
sonal experience into effective legal strategies arid
arguments." And I challenged myself with the
proposition that I ought to be able to convey to
you how that has worked for me-how I have
been able to translate personal experience into ef-
fective legal strategies and arguments. So I really
disciplined my thinking with that question. How
do I do that? What is it I do that does that? How
do I unify myself? How am I both a whole person
and a whole advocate?
What came to mind was a story that I will
tell you, and then I'll try to unfold it a little bit.
Partly I will do this so that you will know more
about me and also so that I can give an example
of what I think is the process of translating per-
sonal experience into effective, productive, crea-
tive advocacy.
In December of 1984, my father died. He
died rather suddenly in the sense that the health
condition that caused him to die was quite sud-
den. He didn't die suddenly in another sense-
among the things that he was all his life was an
active alcoholic, and also an effective and accom-
plished city attorney. He was also a very loyal
and dedicated husband; and a very disruptive
man. He died. And about two weeks after he
died, my mother was experiencing tremendous
grief and loss and was very confused. She said to
me, "You know, before I met your father, I was
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nothing." Those were her exact words. I thought
about that, and it haunted me, and I felt it, and it
stayed with me, and it was one of those things
that qualify as an intensely important personal ex-
perience. This is one personal experience that I
know in my lifetime has been translated into ef-
fective feminist advocacy. I know that my
mother's diminution of herself as a human, be-
cause she is female, has affected my sense of com-
pensation, by moving me in a direction away from
the damaging nature of inequality. I know that I
am affected. I am affected, not just by that mo-
ment's statement of my mother's feeling of self-
worth because she was completely dependent
upon my father, but by the entire experience of
growing up in a family where men were better
than women, where men were more important
than women, and where men were more powerful',
in terms of what they had to offer, than women.
It is difficult to say exactly which of our per-
sonal experiences, for any of us, shapes us to the
extent that we are here today, in this room, as op-
posed to being any of the millions of other places
we could be today. It is difficult to figure out why
we are all involved in law, as opposed to any of
the tremendously diverse array of other occupa-
tions and preoccupations that could absorb us.
And it is a challenge worthy of more than just a
conference in an afternoon. To take apart and
put together and look, at ourselves sufficiently to
know where our arguments and our strategies are
coming from is a formidable task.
The premise of my approach is that our ar-
guments and strategies do not simply happen.
Lawyers, effective lawyers, effective feminist law-
yers, effective egalitarian and humanist lawyers,
and the rest of lawyers, don't just happen. Every-
thing that has happened to any one of us can have
some effect on how we put together a strategy or
an argument.
I think I went deeper in the question to an
underlying question, which is, "What are our
motivations?" Are we here because someone else
is here whose opinion we value? Are we here be-
cause we are tremendously tired of what we think
is the depersonalizing quality of law school and
we hope to get some glimpse of something more
earthy, more real, more sensory? Are we here be-
cause the title is provocative? "Sex, gender and
sexual orientation" is a highly provocative title.
There's a lot packaged up, as you experienced
while identifying with these funny little line draw-
ings on the board. There's a lot packaged up in
those concepts, in those belief systems. And I
don't think I can begin to answer the question of
why we're here. I'm not proposing that at all. I
am saying that I think the question is worth ask-
ing. And I think it's worth continuing to ask.
And I don't think that one ever gets comfortable
with the answers. I think it's important to keep
searching for answers to the question: What are
our motivations about these issues? What are we
up to, both as individuals, and in the combina-
tions of groups, schools of thought and schools of
action, in which we locate ourselves?
So, let us do the second part of the exercise,
and then we'll do some tallying and putting to-
gether of the data and then we're going to go on
to some other things. Here's the second part of
the exercise. Many of you will find it a little bit
more fun than the first part. What I want to ask
you to do is study someone in the room who
you've noticed, whether you know them from
before or you don't know them. Just study them.
And I want you to write down, as candidly as you
possibly can, the first five things you noticed
about that person. I don't want you'to write it
down in such a way that anyone reading your list
can tell who your person is; that isn't what I'm
getting at. We're not looking for gossip or con-
frontation. Rather, what are the variables of that
person that you observed right away. Write down
just the first five. So, everybody do that; feel free
to do it. Don't feel that whether you're focused
on or not is of concern. Just see if you can flow
into the exercise and do. And I'll try to do it too.
And I'll give you about three minutes-three or
four minutes to do it, so we'll have time to talk
about it. If you need to move around to do the
exercise or turn around or anything like that, feel
free. Don't let the room confine you because it
really is rather obstructionist architecture.
Did I get everybody's papers? Christina has
tallied the primary answers, responses, impres-
sions or reactions to those diagrams. Before I
start reading through a few of the observations
you have made about each other, just to give you
a sense of what you observe about other people,
let me ask: how many of you put down gender on
your list? Three of you, four of you. How many
of you didn't observe the gender of the person in
the first five or so things you had on the list? You
didn't? Are you sure? Are you sure you didn't?
Three of you feel you probably didn't observe
gender in the first five descrptive phrases, which
means there were many who did, correct? That's
a pretty darn powerful human variable, when so
many people pay an awful lot of attention to it.
If you doubt that we observe gender and seek
to know it, the evidence of it is your own experi-
ence. It's what you just heard and what you just
imparted to each other. What this means in part,
for those of us concerned about legal advocacy, is
that gender is never a disguised variable. There is
virtually no litigation in which gender is not pres-
ent, affecting other variables, and active. The
gender of the clients, the gender of the lawyers,
the gender of the court, the gender of the case are
present; we can gender documents, we can gender
diagrams, and we can gender cases.
We live in and operate in and do law in an
extremely gender-polarized world. It is enough
so that we can get results of this kind. Would
anyone like to interpret those? (Showing results
of drawing exercise). Does anyone feel particu-
larly confident about what it means that the first
diagram is perceived almost universally as male.
Do we all feel comfortable that we know what
that means? What if I say to you that Diagram 1,
which people largely labeled "male," is a clitoris,
and that Diagram 2, which people largely labelled
"female", is some testes.
All of this is to say that we are powerfully
affected by gender in our perceptions of each
other and of legal issues, of the law, of the author-
ity of the law, of the structure of ideas, of the
times we can talk and the times we must be silent.
We are very much affected by gendering. English
is not a language in which we have articles that
gender, such as "a" and "le" as in French. It is
a language in which objects are supposedly not
gendered. But I challenge you to go through an
hour, just sit down on any given day that you
choose, and not gender. Or maybe do five min-
utes of not gendering. You will see how exhaust-
ing an effort it is, and how amazing an effort it is,
not to gender, or even to pay attention to your
gendering. It may be, and I suggest to you it is
very important, that we need to do precisely that.
Gendering obviously is preserving someone's
values. I don't mean to offer, by having said
everything that I've said, some sort of condemna-
tion or buried criticism of the activity. I'm saying
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the activity of gendering is pervasive. There's a
tremendously important effect of'gender on all of
our ideas, on all of our concepts, on any legal ar-
gument, and how it operates.
My law school portals read, "The law is a
jealous mistress." That's the quote from Oliver
Wendell Holmes that was chosen to apear on the
wall at Boalt Hall. "The law is a jealous mis-
tress." Do you suppose whoever decided to en-
grave that on the building was conscious of their
own pervasive gendering?
Anyway, onward for jealous mistresses, and
with an eye to the clock, I want to read you ran-
domly a few of your own observations about each
other, so you sort of know what people around
you are looking at. "Jovial, warm, communica-
tive, fit, attractive." And if I'm reading yours
wrong, forgive me. I'm not good at handwriting.
"Wide eyes, lips, red something else, bushy eye-
brows, something strong and healthy, posture re-
laxed, and calm." "Hairstyle and clothes, hair-
style, hair color blonde." "Jacket, stylish dress,
blue eyes." "Smile, tired, happy, sensitive, ap-
proachable, self-assured." "Self contained, pleas-
ant untied shoelace." (Laughter)
Let me stop here for a very quick story about
a friend of mine, Donna Hitchens, who does a lot
of lesbian and gay rights litigation in California.
Donna founded San Francisco's Lesbian Rights
Project. She represented a woman named Denise
Krepps who wanted to be a deputy sheriff in Con-
tra Costa County, which is a bit like somewhere
way out on Long Island. So Donna found herself
representing Denise Krepps before a civil service
board that was going to decide whether Denise's
lesbianism prohibited her from being a deputy
sheriff. The county hired an expert who came in
and testified that he could always tell a lesbian
right away-no problem-he knew one and
here's how: "They all have short hair and they sit
with their feet 24 inches apart." (Laughter) So as
far as he was concerned, it was as easy as that.
The category was as superficial as your haircut
and your stance. And he knew everything he
needed to know, at least about the sexual orienta-
tion of lesbians, about that particular group of
women. We had a lot of fun with that testimony
of that expert. Donna also won the case.4
This one says, "sex, race, coloring, posture,
4. Krepps has now been employed as a deputy sheriff for
about six years.
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clothing, age." It's also interesting to consider, to
draw back and consider, whether you tend to ob-
serve other people in a defined order? Do you
have an order in which you take in particular
variables fairly methodically, so that maybe the
first three things you notice are race, gender, age,
or maybe the first thing you notice are clues to
class, such as clothing, which is a clue to class
and a clue against class. Perhaps you look for
socio-economic status. I have a friend who really
tries to perceive level of education. (Laughter)
Really. And she says she's getting more and
more frustrated with it as time goes by because
people are getting more and more disguised in all
directions. Maybe education is becoming a more
expansive concept. I hope so. Because if not,
then I'm doing this too soon. Then we have
"competent, wide framed glasses, beautiful fluffy
curly hair, soft spoken, and provocative; fashiona-
ble, trendy." Someone else has put "colorful,
composed, subdued, dark and bright." And so
on.
I'm not going to take any more time on this.
Providing you don't know each other's handwrit-
ing, if you're interested you can look at all the rest
yourselves. I must preserve your confidentialities
as I promised to do. The only point of all this,
other than just to warm us up and get us thinking
and feeling actively, is to show how gendered and
how gendering we are. That is, what we look at,
and how we look at each other, and how we look
at issues is very much affected by our upbringing,
our conditionings, no matter how defiant of our
backgrounds we may be. You may have been
very conditioned, as I was in my family, to believe
that men were better and then have decided to set
out on a course to prove that men and women are
equal, as I seem to have done. The conditioning
is still present. It is part of me effectively, pro-
foundly, if only to make the turn in the road a
little sharper, and to make me perhaps more hos-
tile at the point where I was turning. Gender
matters, and for family it matters tremendously.
I'm not sure of all the ways in which gender mat-
ters. Each time I do these exercises, I discover
there are new dimensions of the effect of the vari-
able of gender on all of our interactions. If we
can evoke genders from shapes, from doodles I
draw on the board, then, even educational pro-
grams to make people conscious of their own
gendering will not completely erase the effects of
gender as an important and powerful variable.
SCHNEIDER:
Thank you, Mary. Now we will begin the
part of the program in which each of us will talk
briefly about our own perceptions and our own
experience concerning the topic of the workshop,
and perhaps react a bit to each other's percep-
tions. I'm going to start by talking about some of
my own personal experience which shapes my
view of the role that personal experience plays in
forming legal strategy.
I went to law school in a different time; I
graduated from law school in 1973. My decision
to go into law was based on a view of my involve-
ment in the women's movement. When I first
thought about going to law school in 1968, I was
ambivalent because I had been active in civil
rights and other political work in college. I was
ambivalent about how much the law could do; I
had serious questions about how much the law
could assist social change. In 1968 or 1969, the
women's movement started to become very active
both in the United States and in Europe, where I
was at the time. My experience in the women's
movement over those two years gave me a sense
of real urgency about the importance of women
going into law. I thought that women with a fem-
inist consciousness might be able to shape or
reshape the law. In a certain sense, my decision
to go into law had to do with my sense that femi-
nist lawyers could use our experiences as women,
and our insights about women's experience to
help change the law.
The historical context is important here.
The Supreme Court did not decide that sex dis-
crimination was an issue of constitutional dimen-
sion until Reed v. Reed' in 1971. So going into
law at that time was an opportunity to present ar-
guments about the most fundamental issues of
our own experiences, and our own consciousness
as women, not only to the Supreme Court but to
courts around the country. In law school less
than 15% of my class were women. There were
few women lawyers who were involved in any
kind of women's rights activity. It was a time of
enormous excitement for women like myself and
Mary, although she was a few years ahead of me
in law school. I can remember the third Women
5. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
and the Law Conference in California where there
were seventy of us from around the country.
We're now, this year, at the eighteenth National
Conference on Women and the Law and
thousands of women have attended these confer-
ences. We were the people who were beginning to
ask, "What are the issues? What are the ways we
can use our own developing consciousness as wo-
men to begin to illuminate legal argument and
change the law?" . That experience had an enor-
mous effect on all of us.
The women's legal movement has been
unique in the way in which it has used women's
experiences as a basis for legal argument. There
are several reasons for this development.6 First of
all, many feminist lawyers were also activists in
the women's movement. We were articulating
novel concepts legally at the same time that we
were arguing issues politically as activists. We
were articulating those same political issues and
theories in the law itself. The connection between
personal experience and law also came out of no-
tions of feminist theory and politics that many of
us were sharing at that time and that had
emerged from consciousness-raising groups:
namely, that the personal is political. This meant
that we perceived that the supposed dichotomy
between politics or law and personal experience
was not a genuine dichotomy, but that there was
a dialectical interrelationship between the per-
sonal and the political.
Let me see if I can explain this in a more
concrete way for those of you who may not be
familiar with feminist theory. For the women's
movement, theory is not something which is "out
there." Consciousness raising, recounting our
personal experience and sharing that experience
and deriving our politics and our theory from that
personal experience, is the form that the women's
movement politics first took. For women, that
process had a critical political impact because the
experience that we were talking about was experi-
ence which, in the world out there, had tradition-
ally been trivialized, devalued and viewed as per-
sonal. Right? The stuff about how we feel as
women, how our homes are organized, who does
housework, how we take care of our children-
those aren't issues which in 1970 were viewed as
legitimate issues of law, or even public policy.
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Those were issues which were personal issues.
They were deemed to be trivial and insignificant
because they were the things that women talked
about to each other. That was gossip. That
wasn't law. That wasn't politics. That wasn't
policy. For that reason, the transformation of
these "personal" issues, which are politics and
policy and how we live our lives, public policy
into "real" issues such as maternity leave, the
transformation of "trivial" personal experience,
into appropriate public policy and law, has been a
dramatic consequence of the women's movement
and the women's litigation effort over the last fif-
teen to twenty years.
The importance of personal experience as a
vehicle for legal argument was also aided by the
emphasis within feminist theory and the women's
movement on the importance of context, the im-
portance of being very particular, being specific
and starting with our own concrete experience,
the way we perceived things in consciousness rais-
ing. In consciousness raising groups, we didn't
talk generally about the law or policy. We started
with who we were, how we felt. The politics and
theory emerged from there. So in a certain sense
it was a classic reversal of the notion of abstract
theory that most social theory values, and cer-
tainly most of law school, legal education and
legal theory values as well. The women's move-
ment also emphasized the importance of naming
what we felt and claiming it for our own. The
discrimination that we experienced or the ways
that we perceived ourselves to be discriminated
against were an important part of our own experi-
ence. They were important to us as women, and
were a rich source of theory and politics.
In my view, feminist theory has had an enor-
mous impact not only on the law but on many
other academic disciplines, such as sociology, his-
tory, political science. Feminist theory has rekin-
dled an interest in and a rediscovery of our own
history and an explosion of feminist scholarship
that explores these issues.
But law, particularly, is the paradgimatic,
the archetypal example of where the abstract is
important, and where we learn general rules that
are supposedly "objective.," In law what is
deemed to be valuable is outside of our human
experience. Law is the classic example of the tri-
6. For a further discussion of these issues, see Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women 's
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589 (1986).
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umph of the dichotomy between the personal and
the political. We are taught from day one in law
school never to talk about what we feel, never to
talk about our own views. We're taught not to
start off thinking about a legal problem from our
own sense of ourselves as people, or question a
rule based on what might be fair or just or what
we might feel is wrong. We are taught to distrust
our intuition, to hide who we are and to detach
ourselves from our experience of who we are.
Thus, the potential for transformation in law has
been profound because it is a discipline which val-
ues abstraction, values objectivity and places the
primary value on detachment of the rational from
the emotional. For that reason, feminist theory
and feminist litigation have an incredibly impor-
tant intellectual and transformative potential in
the field of law.
I have been extremely privileged to have had
legal jobs which have enabled me to put these
ideas into practice.
When I finished law school I worked as a law
clerk for Judge Constance Baker Motley, former
Chief Judge of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. Judge
Motley was an activist. She had been a lawyer for
the NAACP' Legal Defense Fund and was a role
model for me as a woman because she had inte-
grated her personal experience as a black woman,
with the litigation that she had done. After clerk-
ing for Judge Motley, I worked at the Center for
Constitutional Rights (CCR) for the next seven
years, and then at the Constitutional Litigation
Clinic at Rutgers Law School-Newark. At the
Center, I was able to work in a political context
where the effort to use experience in order to ar-
ticulate legal theory was valued. I was privileged
to work not only with other women lawyers at the
Center who shared that view, but with a lot of
other women around the country, including Mary
and many other people with whom I continue to
feel an extraordinary degree of sisterhood, collegi-
ality and connection.
I think a central assumption of the women's
legal movement has been that law-making is a
form of politics. Rather than confirming the di-
chotomy between the emotional or intuitive and
the rational, our assumption has been that the
best kind of legal theory-making, formulation and
strategy comes out of personal experience. This
does not mean that we confuse who we are with
who our clients are, or try to pretend that all wo-
men's experience is the same. But there is an ef-
fort to connect, not separate, our experience as
women and as lawyers.
Now I can give you some examples of how
this has operated in my own experience. State v.
Wanrow7 is a case in which Nancy Stearns, who
used to be at the Center for Constitutional Rights
and who is now at the New York State Attorney
General's office, and I represented a Native
American woman named Yvonne Wanrow.
Yvonne Wanrow was charged with homicide for
killing a white man whom she believed was trying
to break into the house where she was staying and
assault her kids. Yvonne Wanrow had been con-
victed at trial. We had not been the trial lawyers.
We got the Wanrow case on appeal. We had to
try to understand what had happened to Yvonne
Wanrow. We were struck by a number of things
which now, several years later, seem quite obvi-
ous. At the time, however, they were not obvious
to us. We began to articulate a radical notion.
How could the jury have understood Yvonne
Wanrow's experience as to why she had to defend
herself?
First, as many of you are aware, self-defense
is based on a notion of reasonableness.' As we
began to think about it we realized that self-de-
fense is problematic for women. Psychological
data says women are not perceived as reasonable.
People perceive women as hysterical, emotional,
incapable of being reasonable. These are com-
monly held perceptions. They may be wrong, but
they're commonly held perceptions. These are
perceptions that juries are likely to apply. So how
could Yvonne Wanrow convince a jury that she
was reasonable? Particularly when, in addition to
being a woman, she's a Native American woman
who has killed a white man in a community
which is highly polarized on racial grounds, and
extremely prejudiced against Native Americans.
7. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). For a further
discussion of Wanrow see, Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for
Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-
C.L.L. REv. 623 (1980); Schneider, Describing and Changing:
Women 's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert
Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986);
Schneider and Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend
Themselves In Response to Physical or Sexual Assault. 4
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 149 (1978).
8. For a further discussion of women's self-defense law see
Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 7.
Second, how could she present her view that
she believed she was in imminent danger when a
white man entered the house that she was in in a
way that she perceived as threatening? How was
she going to communicate that to the jury? We
thought hard about the kinds of biases and atti-
tudes which jurors were likely to bring to her
view, to her experience. We understood that it
was important to challenge the notion of reasona-
bleness, of what it meant in that particular case-
to challenge the standards that would govern. It
was important to assert that the judge had to con-
sider, and that the jury should have been in-
structed to consider, Yvonne Wanrow's perspec-
tive as a woman and as a Native American
woman at the time of the incident. That percep-
tion led to our articulation of the notion of sex
bias in the law of self-defense in State v. Wanrow.
In the first appellate opinion of its kind, we
were able to get a plurality of the Washington
Supreme Court to hold for us. Because of the ar-
ticulation of these ideas in Wanrow and in other
cases where these issues were being raised at the
time, such as the Inez Garcia trial,9 a whole body
of law has developed which has become known as
women's self-defense law. Because of that work,
because feminist litigators said "There's some-
thing wrong here," there has been a re-thinking of
traditional criminal law concepts. We said some-
thing's wrong in the assumptions we're making.
The notion that there was something wrong came
directly out of our own experience as women's
rights activists, directly out of our own conscious-
ness-raising experiences, out of our understanding
of sex bias and the concept of reasonableness and
its application to those situations.
I think similar perspectives have been devel-
oped concerning a range of other legal issues on
which the women's rights movement has focused.
Sexual harassment is an example. Fifteen years
ago there was no notion of sexual harassment. It
was not a cause of action. It was not a legal issue.
Now the Supreme Court has made it a cause of
action in the Vinson "' case, although it also made
proving sexual harassment problematic, but that's
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a different issue. The whole notion of sexual har-
assment developed as a legal theory out of women
talking about their experiences in consciousness-
raising groups around the country. Women said,
"This is something which is happening to me
which is not private, which is not trivial, which is
not something that I should accept in the work-
place. It is a harm which requires legal solution
and remedy." There are many other examples of
the way in which women's rights legal theory
emerged from the women's movement, issues
such as pregnancy discrimination and the
problems of battered women. Fifteen years ago,
problems of battered women were not issues of
public policy. Battering was something women
experienced in our homes. That was something
that again was private. It happened to people in
their personal lives. It wasn't public policy, it
wasn't important. The most common type of
criminal activity in this country that happens to
women was not deemed criminal because it
wasn't important enough, because criminal is
public and battery is something that happens to
women in the privacy of their homes. You can
think of innumerable other examples. I hope
you'll think about this and we can talk about it
more fully in the discussion later on.
Now, the form that this integration of per-
sonal experience into legal theory has taken also
deserves some attention. A colleague of mine in
California, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, who teaches
at UCLA Law School, has written about a
friend's brief-writing, experience."1 I think this
story reflects my experience, and I'm sure Mary's
experience, in a way that has a lot to say about
this issue. Carrie's friend described a brief-writ-
ing session on an important women's rights case
that was being litigated in California. People
came together for the weeekend to write the first
draft of the brief. The process involved a vacillat-
ing back and forth between the legal work and the
personal experience by the brief-writers. People
would eat, people would write a draft, then come
back together and talk about how the issues in the
brief related to their lives. In other words, there
9. Inez Garcia killed a man after she had been raped. She
was convicted at her first trial, won retrial on appeal and then
was acquitted at her second trial in 1977. The first judge
apparently rejected an impared mental state defense. On retrial
she asserted self-defense, People v. Garcia, Cv. No. 4259
(Super. Ct. Monterey County). See also Schneider and Jordan
supra, note 7.
10. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399
(1986).
11. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 56-57 (1985).
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was a fluidity, a back and forth process between
what the women working on the brief were doing
as lawyers and as people. I think this process has
strengthened and informed our own capacities as
lawyers.
I think it is important to say all of this be-
cause it is a crucial message to give to many of
you who are law students so that you will not fall
into the trap of the dichotomy between personal
and professional life. The need to overcome this
dichotomy is certainly something that I aspire to
communicate to law students as a teacher. The
importance of sharing this message with law stu-
dents and young lawyers motivated my own move
into teaching from litigation. Much in legal edu-
cation tells students to separate the personal from
the professional. I don't think it is good practice.
I don't think it is good for people to feel that their
lives are separated into their professional roles,
and who they are as human beings. I think it is
profoundly uncomfortable. It is unsatisfying. It
is bound to leave people feeling alienated and de-
pressed both personally and professionally.
I want to give you a sense of empowerment.
I want to give you a sense of support for the possi-
bility of integrating the personal and the political.
Again, I want to emphasize that this does not
mean confusing one's own experience and who
one is as a human being with who the client is. I
was not Yvonne Wanrow. There was no question
about it. She was a poor Native American wo-
man in Washington and I am an upper middle
class White woman; I don't mean to suggest that
our lives were the same. But there was a connec-
tion that Nancy Stearns and I had with Yvonne
Wanrow that was more powerful than she had
with her male trial lawyer who saw her as some-
one very different. That connection, apart from
all the ways in which we were different, gave us
some possibility to incorporate our shared experi-
ence and develop legal arguments, which not only
concretely assisted her, but which, I think, moved
the political and legal formulation of these issues
and struggle forward, in ways which are impor-
tant.
Let me leave you with this message about the
possibility of that sort of integration, and the im-
portance of not making that separation. I hope
we can talk more together later about the ways in
which it is possible to make these connections and
the important human, political, legal and theoret-
ical value in making the connection between the
personal and the political.
MICHAEL LAVERY:
Some of the givens of this conference were
that our personal experiences are (1) useful,
(2) beneficial, generally and (3) beneficial to the
client. Now isn't that what's really important?
What we are talking about is what can and cannot
be useful in representing the client. Certainly
lawyers understand the importance of the person
who is arguing, who is trying to present, as an ad-
vocate, their understanding of themselves, and
how who that person is affects how they perceive
what is useful to their client. I am suggesting that
sometimes we have to step outside of our own ex-
perience and try to relate either to the experience
of the client or of the judge before whom we are
arguing.
This is often true for me. I am one of those
people who does not believe that "gay rights" is
synonymous with "gay liberation." The current
trend is to define gay rights in very narrow terms.
Here in New York, we've recently had a gay
rights bill passed'2 and a lot of people said, "Oh
no, this bill means no more than just what it says
on paper." Believe me, both sides were saying,
"No, we don't want anything more than just this
bill, we have no ideas or plans." Although there's
not too much I can do, that's simply not the way
it is.
I'm not a lawyer in the traditional sense.
Many lawyers lie. They say, "I can defend any-
one." Well, a prominent civil rights attorney a
number of years ago got into problems with the
New York Bar Association when he quite hon-
estly said, "I only defend clients whose causes I
believe in." That's a "no-no" for the law. The
nice stereotypical Wall Street lawyer can say, "I
won't defend this client because he can't afford
me. I won't defend this client because the firm
wouldn't like it." But heaven forbid that some-
one who's involved in political work says, "I only
defend people whose causes are something I be-
lieve in."
This is not entirely true with me. I can de-
fend people or present an argument if I can be
convinced of its merits, as I was, for example,
concerning the adult adoption cases."3 I am not
12. New York, N.Y., Local Law 2 (April 2, 1986). 13. See infra notes 14. 17. 15, and accompanying text.12. e  York, N.Y., Local Law 2 (April 2, 1986). 13. See infra notes 14, 17, 18, and accompanying text.
necessarily a proponent of same-sex adult adop-
tions, though at times I am so classified. In fact I
have no personal desire for them. But it is a cause
which I can fit into a classification within my
political perspective. I find that this is particu-
larly true when I'm doing something pro bono.
I've told people that they may have a great idea,
but if they're asking me to do it for nothing, at
least I should be able to relate to what they're try-
ing to do. I'm not going to devote my time and
energy to do a case pro bono for a cause in which I
have no interest.
Although I can promote the idea of adop-
tion, I have been approached to promote the con-
cept of gay marriage as a next step. Generally,
my response has been, "If you can convince me as
to some arguments I should raise, then I would
take a case attempting to establish the concept of
gay marriage." I have not yet been convinced.
And this is so mainly because the people who
come to me are those who say, "We want to be
married because it will legitimize our relation-
ship." This of course implies that their relation-
ship, outside of marriage, is not legitimate. To
me, gay marriage means gay divorce. This is an-
other problem. All the problems that I see with
heterosexual marriage, and I'm not a great propo-
nent of heterosexual marriage either, would ac-
company gay marriage. I don't want the situation
arising of someone saying, "Oh, these two guys,
they're living in sin, outside of wedlock. That's
terrible." But our perceptions often cause us to
view things in this way. Many people would say,
"Straight society says that, to be in a legitimate
relationship, you must have qualities A, B and
C." Now, as progressive people, gays and lesbi-
ans would say, ".Oh no, a marriage need not meet
those requirements in order to be a legitimate re-
lationship." We will say that a legitimate rela-
tionship need not have quality A or D, but it must
still have B and C, and disagree with all those
people who want E, where E may be adoption.
Matter of Adult Anonymous 4 was the first
adult adoption case which went through family
court in Brooklyn. It wasn't appealed, so there is
a decision on it. That particular case was litigated
prior to the New York State sodomy law being
declared unconstitutional in People v. Onofre."'
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Onofre16 had already been argued. Matter of
Adoption of Adult Anonymous I was put on
"hold" awaiting a decision in the Onofre case.
When Onofre came down, the Surrogate decided
Matter of Adult Anonymous I. That case involved
two people-one, a twenty-two year old male, the
other four years older. Matter of Adult Anony-
mous I,7 which I worked on, was also a New
York case involving two men in their late thirties
or early forties. Matter of Robert P. "g involved
two men, one who was fifty, one almost sixty.
Now what does all this mean? Does this mean
anything in particular? Certainly none of these
cases presented a worst case scenario. In terms of
some of my other clients, however, they are atypi-
cal. Maybe one can accept the adoption idea in
these situations because you have two nice men
who are somewhat the same age. But what if an
adoption case involves one person who is fifty and
one who is fifteen? Then we get into other is-
sues-what do we mean, what are our perceptions
of this, how do we react to this? Whether it be in
terms of sex, as Mary brought up, although she
used the term "gender." I do have some
problems as to whether or not we equate "sex"
and "gender" as being the same thing. But also,
there are our perceptions of age. What is proper,
what is improper, all the implications that flow
from our perceptions of age. Now, you can use
those perceptions and you must be aware of them.
You must use your personal experience. This is
particularly true for gay and lesbian liberation,
gay and lesbian rights, and gay rights litigation.
In arguing before a judge, one must attempt
either to make the judge aware of what he or his
ingrained perceptions are, or to disabuse her or
him of the various thoughts that she or he has as
to what are proper perceptions.
For example, in the adoption case, In the
Matter of Robert Paul P., I believe that the Surro-
gates had already decided the case before we ever
got into court. It began badly and ended badly.
They said, "What can you do to convince me that
this adoption should go through?" They had read
the appellate court decision in Matter of Adult
Anonymous H"' and didn't believe that it applied.
They said, "Prove to me why I should permit this
14. Matter of Adult Anonymous I, 106 Misc. 2d 792, 434
N.Y.S.2d 527 (Fam. Ct. 1981).
15. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 N.Y.S. 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980).
16. Id.
17. 88 A.D.2d 30, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198 (App. Div. 1982).
18. 63 N.Y.2d 233, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652, 471 N.E.2d 424
(1984).
19. 88 A.D.2d 30, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198 (App. Div. 1982).
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adoption." In my opinion, it was not the law to
require us to make such a proof.
When Robert Paul P. was argued before the
Appellate Division, the worst thing that could
happen before an appeals court happened. John
may talk about a case that we worked on to-
gether. He argued Avest Seventh Corp. v.
Ringelheim20 before the Appellate Term before a
panel of judges who asked no questions. You just
argue, say "thank you" and then, nothing. The
Appellate Division was even worse. We went to
the Appellate Division in In The Matter of Robert
Paul P. I got up to argue. They said "Counselor,
we've already decided." The Appellate Division
said, "We've already decided Matter of Adult
Anonymous I. Is there anything in this case
which is different from the case that we have al-
ready decided?" They approved the adoption in
Matter of Adult Anonymous I. My response was,
"Your Honor, I don't expect to say it often-but
this case is, as we say in law school, on all fours.
There is nothing in this case, factually or other-
wise, which is different from the case in which
you approved the adoption." The second Justice
said, "Was the Matter of Adult Anonymous II ap-
pealed?" I said, "No, your Honor, it was not."
"Counselor, you don't have anything more to say,
do you?" There was no one on the other side in
this case either. Corporation counsel sitting in
New York declined to submit a brief, and de-
clined to argue the case. So here I have a panel
that has already decided the same issues. It has
already been told to me and stressed, particularly
in the Appellate Division, First Department, that
they have little time and they really wish that at-
torneys would not take up unnecessary time, and
that they will only ask questions if they find it
necessary. Now the panel is saying, "You don't
have anything to say." So I said, "No, Your
Honor, I don't. have anything to say."
The panel upheld the lower court decision
denying the adoption without opinion." We then
20. Avest Seventh Corp. v. Ringelheim, 458 N.Y.S.2d 178
(App. Div. 1982) (per curiam). This was a reversal of the lower
court opinion (109 Misc. 2d 284, 440 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1981))
which held that lesbians living together do not constitute a
family unit and which allowed eviction of such tenants. The
Appellate Term's per curiam opinion relied on the reasoning in
420 East 80th Company v. Chin, 115 Misc. 2d 195, 455
N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Term. 1982). There, the Appellate Term
held that the "immediate family" clause in a lease could not be
invoked as a predicate for eviction if its application would result
in unlawful discrimination.
go to the Court of Appeals. Now, that's the only
time that I tried to relate, not to my personal ex-
perience, but tried to put the issues into the per-
spective of the judge. Two judges dissented, so I
know that maybe I got through to someone.22
The difficulty is that we often talk in terms of ab-
stracts, even to courts. But judges are also
human. Some of them need that personalization
of the issues in order to relate to them. I at-
tempted to take the judges' experience, dangerous
ground though it may be, and connect it with
what I was arguing. I did this so that they had
some personal connection to the issues, as op-
posed to those abstract things in the back of their
minds, which distance them from the real issues.
One of the questions, actually the whole dis-
cussion, was on the nature of child-parent rela-
tionships. The lower court decision said "This
adoption should not go through because they did
not have a parental relationship." My whole ar-
gument was that a parental relationship depends
on who the parties are. That is, there is no single
"parental relationship." The relationship be-
tween a six year old and his parents is a differefnt
relationship from a relationship between an adult
child and her parents. I said to Judge Cooke,
who is in his sixties and about to retire, "Your
Honor, if your mother were still alive, certainly
you would still be your mother's child. But to
suggest that, at your age, your relationship to
your mother is the same as it was when you were
six, is absurd. Nevertheless, it is a parental rela-
tionship." Judge Cooke was one of the people
who wrote the dissent, who was in favor of the
adoption.
It is important to try to make those connec-
tions sometimes. Who knows? In sex cases we
don't know what judges are doing. Whether we
are in the Supreme Court or any other court, we
must ask: how much can you really talk about
sex? How will they react? In LAMBDA'S
Uplinger23 brief, the case involving loitering for
21. 97 A.D.2d 991, 469 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1983).
22. Id. at 239. Judge Meyer wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Chief Judge Cooke joined. Judge Wachtler took no part
in the decision.
23. People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460
N.Y.S.2d 514 (1983), The LAMBDA Legal Defense and
Education Fund wrote an amicus brief for the case, as did the
Center for Constitutional Rights and the New York Civil
Liberties Union. In Uplinger, the Court held that the New
York State statute that prohibited loitering in a public place for
the purpose of engaging in or soliciting sexual behavior of a
the purposes of sexually deviant conduct, it was
asked, "How clearly can you talk about sex?"
Does it matter? In our brief, we used the phrase,
"an invitation to acts of personal intimacy."
What is "an invitation to an act of personal inti-
macy?" Does the court really know what you're
talking about? Do they know that the man was
sitting on the stoop and he said to the police of-
ficer, "Come home with me and I'll suck your
cock?" That was supposed to be covered by the
phrase, "an invitation to an act of personal inti-
macy." Does it really matter? I don't know any-
more whether it matters if it is said graphically or
obscurely. If it is said obscurely, the court may
not even have any idea what you're talking about.
If it is said graphically, then they're offended be-
cause, my God, you have said such words in front
of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.
The hall has been sullied by your language. No
one knows whether it matters, and if it does mat-
ter, no one knows which way is better. Lawyers
have to face that kind of decision.
LAMBDA'S brief in Hardwick v. Bowers
24
cites to The Advocate.25 What does that mean? I
have no idea anymore. Is the Supreme Court go-
ing to go to the Library of Congress and look up
The Advocate? Certainly they have access to it.
Should you be concerned that they may see a pho-
tograph or an ad when one of the law clerks is
looking up the citation? Are they really going to
look it up? Is it necessary to search around to
find, as opposed to The Advocate, a citation for
the point to the Tasmanian Law Review because
it's a law review, but equally obscure? I don't
know. The main thing that I'm suggesting is that
you have to realize what your perceptions are.
It's important to make some judgment about
what the perceptions of the person to whom
you're arguing might be. Now, you can't do that
without some self-examination. Unless you know
yourself, it is very difficult to try to perceive what
kind of person someone else is. You should at
least be aware of when you are using someone
else's phrase. There is a publication from Phila-
delphia from a number of years ago by Gay Lib-
eration which asked the question, "Does the en-
emy have a battle line in your head?" That is,
how much of your perceptions, how much of your
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argument is based upon things which you may
not clearly realize-things like your conceptions
of race, sex, gender-stereotyping, that you have
not previously examined.
One of my clients is a constant problem to
me. I have represented the North American Man
Boy Love Association, NAMBLA. Certainly,
NAMBLA was an organization which, at best,
consisted of members of the gay community. To
put it mildly-this raises questions. It may not
raise the question that I would like to consider. It
may not raise the questions that you would like to
consider. Many of the things that I am arguing
today on behalf of NAMBLA are the same ques-
tions that were raised a number of years ago in
regard to most lesbians and gay men. We would
hear people say, "This is outrageous, how could
anyone even talk about this?" I am old enough to
remember that when I went to law school the
concept that a woman should have the State pay
for an abortion was an outrageous concept be-
cause abortions were illegal. This was not even to
suggest that Medicare or Social Security should
pay for the abortion, or to suggest that a fifteen
year old female should be able to consent to an
abortion without her parents' knowledge. These
were matters which were, at best, unthinkable.
Times change. Some things which were so
easy to say, "Oh no," to before, now I don't know
which way to decide. It's much easier to dismiss
something and say "Oh, it's unthinkable." I
don't want to spend time thinking about the un-
thinkable. I only want to suggest that those
things that you can easily say, "Oh, no, we can't
examine that now. This is etched in stone. It is
so important. You can't challenge it." I don't
care how you end up. In some ways I do, but it's
more important that the assertion be challenged.
You have to know what those perceptions or un-
challenged assertions are. If you say, with regard
to relationships, they are acceptable only within a
certain age. If you say it's okay if you are a
twenty-year-old who has a relationship with a
forty-year-old, maybe with a fifty-year-old, maybe
with a sixty-year-old. All these situations chal-
lenge the perception that we have made, in terms
of ageism. Certainly, as Mary pointed o t, a
number of things that you see, for example, a
deviate nature could not stand without a requirement that the
conduct be offensive or annoying to others.
24. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
25. The Advocate is a bi-weekly publication with a primarily
gay male readership.
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couple with one thirty-year-old and one eighty-
year-old, we ask, "Is that right? What are they
doing together?" It's there as part of our percep-
tion. Be aware of it as part of your perception;
also be aware that part of it is your conclusion.
It has been the issue observed that most men
spend their time defending opinions, not because
we believe them to be true but simply because at
one time we thought that they were. One of the
first things I came across with regard to experi-
ence, internalized experience, is something from
Donald Webster Cory's The Homosexual in
America.26 Cory idealistically maintained that, as
gay people, we are constantly bombarded by what
other people think of us, and that we know that
many of the things that are said about us are un-
true. We should use that experience to under-
stand how we view other people. There's a world
out there, outside, that says gay people are, this or
that, and we're saying from our experience, "No,
that's not true." You should be able to realize
that if other people are making group generaliza-
tions, you should at least be able to challenge
them. Life is a constant challenge in terms of
those perceptions and those givens. The ability to
confront and challenge those perceptions and giv-
ens is what makes effective lawyers. You must
learn to use your personal experience, without al-
lowing it to control you. It is most important to
be aware of what your own perceptions are, from
your personal experience, and what are the per-
ceptions of others.
DUNLAP:
I appreciate what. Liz and Mike had to say. I
enjoyed tremendously their articulation of their
own distinct, and at the same time, common ex-
periences of being lawyers, litigators, advocates
and people applying their humanity to a series of
both very real,' close-up situations and sometimes
more distant and personal challenges. Thank you
both very much.
I want to talk about Bowers v. Hardwick,
2 7
on the question of how you phrase the issue so
you win. So I've had to phrase it right. The state
of Georgia phrases it as whether an individual ho-
mosexual has the right to commit sodomy. That
is a really terrific way to phrase an issue in such a
way as to determine the outcome. It was Wendy
Williams who said, "The lawyer who gets to char-
acterize the issue tends to win.",21 I think she's
right.
SCHNEIDER:
Characterize the issue or state the facts.
DUNLAP:
Yes. When you can state the facts in such a
way as to govern the conclusion sufficiently, then
you've done your job as an advocate. Bowers is a
case that involves not only the constitutionality of
Georgia's sodomy law but, obviously, its implica-
tions. In its political magnitude, in its symbolic
value, Bowers involves legitimation, validity, legal
survival, and eventually political and human sur-
vival, because it involves gay men, lesbians, bisex-
uals and anyone who engages in oral-or
anal-genital contact. That's what the Georgia
law prohibits. I love it. I love that law for its
framing of sodomy, because it brings home that
almost anything you might do sexually is illegal.
As Norm Nickens, who is a former assistant dean
of New College and a gay rights activist has said,
"If your lips leave their lips, then you're a
felon." 2 9 That gets it all across. The "capacious-
ness", as Laurence Tribe might say,30 of the cate-
gory is so complete that almost anyone has com-
mitted sodomy.3' That's important, at least for
people who have some memory of their sexual ex-
perience.
I want to talk about Bowers v. Hardwick in
terms of the issues of translation that both Liz
and Mike raised. "Translation" is the key word, I
think, in the title of this conference. We translate
that which we do not believe someone else will
understand. That's what a translation is. And
26. D.W. CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA (1951).
27. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
28. Professor Wendy Williams, who teaches sex
discrimination and law, among other courses, made this
observation in courses that she and Ms. Dunlap taught together
in the San Francisco Bay Area law schools during the years
1972-1975.
29. Mr. Nickens made this remark in a class he taught with
Mary Dunlap at New College Law School in San Francisco in
the Fall of 1985.
30. "[O]nce that tradition [of sexual activity in private as a
.reverse liberty'] is recognized . . . it provides an umbrella
capacious enough to subsume homosexual as well as
heterosexual variants." (emphasis added). L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-43, at 947 (1978).
31. See Brief Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project in
support of petitioner in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841
(1986) n.3, reprinted in 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. Soc. CHANGE 953
(1986), for reference to the pervasiveness of sodomous sex
practices as defined in the Georgia law upheld in Bowers.
when it comes down to it, a lot of the things that
we have been saying up here are about our expec-
tations of what will not be understood. I think it
is largely an informed and an enlightened expec-
tation that the members of the U.S. Supreme
Court would not readily grasp or understand or
accept or identify with the gay and lesbian experi-
ence. It is a lot of both personal experience and
personal lawyer experience that all of us have
been outlining. Those are our premises.
The other side of the coin is that we are all
alike naked and, as Barbara Deming said, "We
are all part of one another." Barbara Deming
was a magnificent feminist skill lesbian activist
skill writer who was one of the stars in "The Si-
lent Pioneers," a film made about senior gays and
lesbians. Barbara Deming, who is now dead, said
we are all part of one another. When Liz was ar-
ticulating the Wanrow32 case, I realized that she,
Nancy Stearns 33 and Yvonne Wanrow came clos-
est to the meaning of that idea. While our clients
are independent, separate human beings, with a
series of problems only parts of which we can
touch or do much about as lawyers, at the same
time, we are all part of one another. It is that
understanding, that knowledge, that conscious-
ness of our connectedness, of the idea that what I
do will affect you, will have some impact on you,
that I think begins to challenge us to do that
translating in the most caring and inspired way
possible.
On Bowers v. Hardwick , I wanted to talk
about translation in a more concrete sense. I have
in front of me an amicus curiae brief filed by the
Lesbian Rights Project, the Women's Legal De-
fense Fund, Equal Rights Advocates, of which I
am one of the mothers, the Women's Law Project
and the National Women's Law Center,35 which I
wrote and which some other people edited and
worked on and refined and approved. So it's a
team effort. I also have a brief for the respondent
by Laurence Tribe, Kathleen Sullivan, Brian
Koukoutchos and Kathleen Wilde. 6 This is the
respondent Michael Hardwick's brief; Mr. Hard-
wick is the individual who was arrested in his
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bedroom for committing the crime of sodomy
under Georgia law. He was arrested by a cop
who came to serve him a warrant on a drunk-in-
public charge. It makes you think that maybe the
guy is in a little bit of political trouble if they'd
serve this warrant, for such a petty offense, at his
home.
I looked at the briefs to try to identify the
commonalities between the arguments. Our ami-
cus briefs were all prepared with some knowledge
on Professor Tribe's part and with some collabo-
ration and interpretation of ideas. So it's not as if
Laurence Tribe entered his brief for the respon-
dent completely uninformed of what we were do-
ing in California and what others were doing on
behalf of LAMBDA,3 7 the ACLU and some of
the other organizations that filed amicus briefs.
Tribe's argument on why the Georgia sod-
omy law is unconstitutional centers on a con-
struction of the fourth amendment privacy of the
home.38 The focus is not on the gay rights aspect
nor on the impact of the sodomy law. It is on the
transgression of an inviolable boundary of the
castle. Remember, "a man's home is his castle.'
Tribe's argument very carefully emphasizes a rel-
atively safe constitutional approach, I don't mean
to say it was necessarily a "winning approach." I
don't mean to say it was necessarily an approach
that would satisfy five members of the Court. It
was safe in terms of an effort to de-homosexualize
the case. It was conscious. It was done adver-
tently. It was done with the knowledge that the
Court is homophobic.
This is a very primitive, thumbnail, quick
summary of all the really complex scholarship
and argument and collaboration that went into
the decision to emphasize the fourth amendment
with which I profoundly and adamantly disagree.
We can talk at great length about why I do and I
would love to do that, but I think that will get us
off the point. In Tribe's brief, there are several
paragraphs, two of which are crucial," on the
question of the impact of this law on gays and les-
bians. The first instance in which one realizes
that Tribe makes the point that there is also a dis-
32. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548.
33. Nancy Stearns is currently employed at the office of the
New York Attorney General, Bureau of Environmental
Protection.
34. 106 S. Ct. 2841.
35. Brief Atnicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project, supra,
note 3 1.
36. Brief for Respondent, Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct.
2841 (1986).
37. LAMBDA Legal Defense and Education Fund.
38. Brief for Respondent, supra, note 36, at 17-29.
39. Id. at 8-9.
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criminatory element in this law is in footnote
fourteen. I think it's interesting that the very ar-
gument that forms thirty pages of our brief forms
a footnote and then another paragraph in Tribe's
brief. In the footnote Tribe says that it is for just
this reason, a reason having to do with the nature
of interpreting fundamental rights, that Justice
Harlan in Poe v. Ullman4 ° said, in dicta, that
homosexuals have no privacy protection, that the
general public opinion of a by-gone day condemn-
ing contraceptives could not justify the criminal-
ization of their use. Likewise, the general public
opinion of an earlier day that led Justice Harlan
to take for granted the condemnation of homosex-
ual practices could not justify the criminalization
of those practices today. In the quarter of a cen-
tury that has passed since Justice Harlan wrote,
more than half the states in the union have de-
criminalized private homosexual acts between
consenting adults and our nation's professional
societies have taken the position that such acts
should not be condemned either by medicine or
by law."'
Now, over here in the Lesbian Rights Project
amicus brief is what amounts to the same argu-
ment, in very different language. We are talking
about issues- of translation, and I want you to
have the contrast in your mind. This is in the
summary of the argument. "The amici believe
that the privacy decisions of this court, from the
earliest to the most recent, support the position
that it is within the fundamental rights of the in-
dividual person to make such intimate personal
choices as are not only proscribed, but criminal-
ized, by the 'anti-sodomy' law of the state of
Georgia. Amici for respondent assert that the
need for love is. natural and that the determina-
tion to express and receive love of a sexual nature
by engaging in sexual activities with another adult
of the same gender is one possible type of behav-
ior within the range of medical and psychological
normalcy."42 What ends up feeling interminable
in the process of translation are the arguments
about how to translate among all of us who are on
Michael Hardwick's side.
I'd like to go back to a little story that I pul-
led out of a book called Simple Justice by Richard
Kluger,43 a book that should be required reading
in law school. The book is an effort to tell the
story of Brown v. Board of Education" in its full,
historical context, with a richness of detail that
describes the lives of people affected by the move-
ment for racial equality, civil rights, and integra-
tion that Brown symbolizes. In Simple Justice
Kluger tells a story with which Justice Marshall
is credited. In some small town in the South, in
the course of putting things together in order to
get school integration cases brought, this small
town had a group of black citizens who were like
a Black Chamber of Commerce. They were well-
groomed, very polished, very diplomatic, quite
conservative and very dedicated to the proposi-
tion that the schools ought to be integrated. The
same small town had a group of black citizens
whose members' identities were kept secret.
These latter Blacks were fire-brands, and very
radical people, who pushed a "freedom now"
agenda with no compromises. What Marshall
discovered, of course, working in a small town,
was that the memberships of the two groups were
identical
That's the way it ought to be. Sometimes
that doesn't turn out to be true. I don't mean to
say that all our differences are unreal, but when it
comes to moving the Court forward, we are all at
the same table. We are at the same table, but we
may disagree so profoundly about how to trans-
late, that one says to the other, 'Please don't file
that brief. You're ruining my case. I can't get up
there." Or that one says to the other (the sexual
harassment case previously mentioned45 is an ex-
ample), "Please don't use the word 'fuck' in the
Supreme Court; they're not ready for it." We
could go on forever among ourselves about
whether or not anyone ought to do that. But all
of this is an effort to say that we must work very
conscientiously with the idea that there are vari-
ous ways to translate these ideas, no one of which
is necessarily overwhelmingly better.
So I disagree with Tribe's fourth amendment
approach and let me tell you why. Substantively
speaking, Chief Justice Rehnquist already has
gone off on the fourth amendment. Fourth
amendment privacy is the only form of privacy he
40. 367 U.S. 497, 546-47 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 36, at 8-9 n.14.
42. See Brief Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project,
supra note 31.
43. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, passim (1977).
44. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ. (II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
45. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399
(1986).
recognizes, constitutionally. See the University of
Kansas Law Review, 1974,46 in which he pub-
lished an article called, Is Effective Law Enforce-
ment Consistent with an Expanded Right to Pri-
vacy?, subtitled Privacy, You've Come a Long Way
Baby. But the article is wonderful. I think it is a
tirade. It gives one an insight into the person of
Chief Justice Rehnquist. This is a person who
rarely ventures outside his narrow realm. He de-
pends on his wife's experiences in express check-
out lines in supermarkets for the idea that people
cheat. 47 Yet Tribe, in Bowers48, chose to empha-
size not privacy of the person but privacy of the
home. One of the problems that the privacy of
the home argument creates, and it came up in
Tribe's argument, is what about motels? What
about cars? What about bath houses? In oral ar-
gument, Tribe's reputed to have stated something
like "Well, I'm not sure about motels, and I agree
with you, cars are different than homes." The
fact of the matter is that all the time, all over this
country, people are arrested for sex acts that oc-
cur someplace other than in the home. We are all
struggling womanfully and manfully to determine
what the boundaries of privacy are. It is not time
to give it all away by saying, "If you own a house
then you can fuck who you please, but if you
don't, good luck." That's a mistake. It's a mis-
take if Laurence Tribe says it and it's a mistake if
Justice Powell says it.
49
But the other side of the coin is that what
they're saying is that if you aren't willing to ac-
cept our argument, our "little house" argument,
you ain't got nothin'. There is no place that is
safe. Nobody's going to get to do it. So just face
it, this is the beginning. The house is the founda-
tion, or the home is the foundation, for the expan-
sion of a right to privacy that will not be generous
enough to include those of us who don't fit in this
house, or who don't have a house. I am con-
cerned about poor gay people and public gay peo-
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pie. These too must have privacy, or it is another
rich person's niche in the Bill of Rights.
The difference about which guarantee of the
Constitution to emphasize is obviously bigger
than our understandings of the constitutional
doctrines involved. There is more to this disa-
greement between Professor Tribe and myself
than whether or not the fourth amendment says
"unreasonable search and seizure" or whether it
says right of the person to have privacy vis-a-vis
the government. Justice White is very hung up
about that."° The word privacy occurs nowhere
in the Constitution. He's quite right. But neither
does the word racism. If anyone reads the Con-
stitution to understand what some of the guaran-
tees are, certainly the word racism, not only as an
idea but also as a reality of surpassing constitu-
tional presence and importance, would emerge.
In terms of translating personal experience to
effect legal argument, I want to say one more
thing about Bowers. Then I want to give an an-
swer to Mike's question about how direct to be
about sexual talk with the Supreme Court, be-
cause I have a position I want to take. Here's
what I think the answer is to the question about
how direct to be with the Supreme Court. This is
also in the amicus brief we filed. Feminist poet
and philosopher Adrienne Rich (now that's as
wild as any cite to the U.S. Supreme Court ever
was), has written of the danger of hypocrisy about
sexuality, in moving terms, as follows: "Hetero-
sexuality as an institution has also drowned in si-
lence the erotic feelings between women. I myself
lived half a lifetime in the lie of that denial. That
silence makes us all to some degree into liars.
The possibilities that exist between two people are
the most interesting things in life. The liar is
someone who keeps losing sight of these possibili-
ties." 5
It seems to me that one of the troubles we've
had historically in sex litigation, which is related
to and different from gender litigation, is a lack of
46. Rehnquist, Is Effective Law Enforcement Consistent with
an Expanded Right to Privacy?, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 19
(1974). See also M. Dunlap, Where the Person Ends, Does the
Government Begin? An Exploration of Present Controversies
Concerning 'The Right to Privacy'," 12 LINCOLN L. REV. 47
(1981) (discussing the Rehnquist article); see generally Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. Rehnquist, supra note 46.
48. 106 S. Ct. 2841.
49. Id. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring).
50. Id. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice White served as one of the moot court
judges for the moot court finals at Stanford University Law
School in the Spring of 1985. The moot court problem was one
of the constitutionality of a Georgia-type "sodomy" law that
had been used to prosecute two lesbians for oral sex. Justice
White repeatedly questioned counsel for the two lesbians about
where they found "privacy" in the U.S. Constitution.
51. A. RICH, WOMEN AND HONOR: SOME NOTES ON
LYING (5th printing, 1979) quoted in Brief Amicus Curiae for
Lesbian Rights Project, supra note 31, at 19.
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directness, a lack of candor, a lack of truthfulness,
and a lack of people looking each other in the eye
and saying this is what's going on here. 2 I think
that the reality that several tens of millions53 of
people depend to some extent for the legitimation
of their legal (if not their human) existences on
the outcome of Bowers is to dodge, among other
things, the opportunity to break through. We
have a chance here to break through and raise
consciousness, not only in the law, but in human
tolerance and human understanding. We are all
part of each other and our sexualities are all part
of a healthy, medically and psychologically nor-
mal spectrum.
And so, I have an opinion on how direct to
be about sex. I want us to tell truth of the kind
Adrienne Rich talked about. We will differ and
we must differ about the language that we use.
But I think within those differences we have to
have a basic understanding that we're not going
to sell out on the fundamental questions. In the
same way, when the ERA was being ratified, we
couldn't accept the position of some organizations
that you could talk about the ERA, but not about
abortion choice, not about lesbian rights, not
about sexual harassment. 54 Don't, in short, talk
about anything hot. Ladies could have equality.
Ladies, as it turned out, given the legal system,
didn't need it. It was everybody else who did. So
that we were being asked, we were being invited,
we were being encouraged to trade off the very
thing that we were fighting for. You've gotta
watch out for that. I think Laurence Tribe's gotta
watch out for it. I gotta watch out for that. We
all gotta watch out for that.
I think there is an element of an answer to
the question about how direct to be in Adrienne
Rich's ethic. It is this: we've got to figure out,
with all our diversity, how to be truthful. The
power my clients have is that they, as victims of
sexual harassment, employment discrimination
because they're gay or lesbian, or a whole panoply
of invasions of civil rights, are telling important
personal truths in legal context. They're translat-
ing, in the law, their own lives and suffering in a
system that has yet to develop principles to deal
with some of their experiences. That system chal-
lenges all of us to do the translating.
JOHN DEWITT GREGORY:
The topic, as I understand it, is an explora-
tion of ways to translate personal experience into
effective legal arguments and strategies. When I
was called about this, I'll have to confess that I
wondered why I was recommended. It was ex-
plained to me that it was because of a case Mike
Lavery mentioned, Avest Seventh Corp. v.
Ringelheim." I have to tell you how I got in-
volved in that case, which involved an attempt to
evict two unrelated lesbian women from an apart-
ment. I was called on to help with the appeal of
the case because I have an interest in family law.
I teach family law. One of my former students
was involved in the LAMBDA Legal Defense and
Education Fund. We had talked after she gradu-
ated, and I told her if she got cases involving fam-
ily relationships and the like, I might be inter-
ested in doing some appellate amicus work. So
they called me about this case and said it was a
case involving a gay family relationship. I said,
"Terrific." And then it turned out to be a land-
lord/tenant case. That's really what it was.
Now that I have heard what has gone before,
I must say that I'm even more mystified as to
what my expected role is here, because if I under-
stand the premise underlying this discussion, I
probably disagree with it. Incidentally, there is
apparently some relevance, at least I gathered
that as I was discussing the reason for the invita-
tion, to my being viewed as a black lawyer or as a
lawyer who happens to be black. I don't know
which, but I think there's a difference. And I sup-
pose that there was some notion that there might
be some analogies to feminist lawyering and gay
lawyering in the sense of my membership in still
another traditionally despised minority group.
But as I have already suggested, I have some
problems with the underlying premise.
One of the things that troubles me is that I
52. See id.
53. "There are some 20 million lesbians and gay men living
in the United States today," Hitchens, foreword to H. CURREY
and D. CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY
COUPLES (2d ed. 1985) and J. Marmor estimates 5-10% gay
male and 3-5% lesbian population, MARMOR, HOMOSEXUAL
BEHAVIOR: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL 7 (1980) cited in Brief
Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project, supra, note 31, at 6.
54. Ms. Dunlap lobbied throughout California, Nevada and
Washington for federal ERA ratification. She was often
discouraged from raising abortion choice or lesbian right issues
in these efforts. See also Linker, The Equal Rights Amendment:
An Analysis of the Campaignsfor Ratification in California and
Utah in SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND
REMEDIES 181 (B. Badcock ed. 1975).
55. 458 N.Y.S.2d 178 (App. Div. 1982) (per curiam).
suspect when one talks about ways to translate
personal experience into effective legal argument,
this might be to suggest that we should translate
personal experience into legal argument and strat-
egies. Now, with that, two things occur to me
which may seem to be contradictory, but I don't
think they are-they're just different. The first
thing that occurs to me, and I think Michael Lav-
ery has suggested this in a way, is that personal
experience is always going to affect the way in
which we practice law. It seems to me that to say
that, and to go on and on and on about it, is really
to place otiose emphasis on the obvious. I think
everything we do is bound to reflect our personal
experience. My concern is about some of the im-
plications of suggesting that there's something
special or something better about personal experi-
ence affecting our lawyering.
Since we were told to look at personal experi-
ence for this symposium, which I rarely do, be-
cause I think other things out there are more in-
teresting than I am, I forced myself to look at my
own personal experience as a lawyer. I didn't
think about it long, but I guess it has encom-
passed five or six areas. For a while I was simply
working in firms. For a while in the beginning I
did some negligence work up in Harlem. The
only place I could get a job at the time was as a
single practitioner on 125th Street, which wasn't
bad, by the way. Then, I went downtown and did
some labor law representing management and
some commercial law, and things of that kind.
Another area where I spent a lot "of time was liti-
gating for the state, which is where I got this ap-
pellate experience. And what I did mainly was to
represent wardens of state prisons when prisoners
on writs of habeas corpus were trying to get out. I
guess my job was to keep them in.
I don't agree with Michael that lawyers who
say they can represent anyone are lying. I basi-
cally believe this. I think the lawyer's task was
best described in another context by a writer, I
think, who said, "Whose bread I eat, whose wine
I drink, his song I sing." I think that's really
what lawyers do. I do believe that I can represent
just about anybody, but I have two exceptions.
One, I don't think I could represent a drug dealer
who was selling heroin and crack and the like in
poor, black neighborhoods. Two, I don't think I
could represent someone who was accused of sex-
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ual molestation of a child. But that has to do
with my own personal values, or whatever you
want to call them. I think that any ethical stan-
dards you read will say that if a lawyer finds a
cause personally obnoxious, so that he could not
do his best job in representing a client, he's free
not to accept it. But those are the only categories
of cases that I can think of.
When I went back to review this experience,
I couldn't think of any occasion when my per-
sonal experience significantly contributed to my
legal argument or strategies. It seems to me that
lawyers who are generally the best advocates for
any cause are those who have two essential quali-
ties: brains and analytical ability. I can see by
the facial expressions that some of you object to
that, but this is based on my personal experience.
The lawyers I've met who have been most suc-
cessful in representing clients effectively have had
those two qualities. This is why I would suggest
to you that it is precisely Laurence Tribe, who
wrote one book which you really shouldn't get
out of law school without reading, which is Trea-
tise on Constitutional Law, 6 who should have ar-
gued before the United States Supreme Court in
the Bowers case. 7 I doubt whether anybody wor-
ried for long about what his sexual orientation
may be or what his personal experiences were, ex-
cept for his personal experiences before the
United States Supreme Court where he has been
eminently successful.
What I fear, and you know as I heard all this
passion I promised myself for once that I was not
going to become passionate, is that too often
when we talk about personal experience we are
really talking about our personal biases, or big-
otry, or hang-ups. And that's why we have to be
careful. I know that. I find that in teaching there
are times when I've had great difficulty under-
standing a case. I thought it was because of an
intellectual inability and then I finally realized
that I had some personal life experience which
was hanging me up on a case and then I under-
stood it. So it is really a two-edged sword. Per-
sonal experience can certainly be useful and help-
ful as I suggest. We can't get away from it but it
can also be disabling if we don't recognize the
emotional baggage that comes from personal ex-
perience so that we can deal with it.
I'll give a few examples. The first case book
56. TRIBE, supra, note 30. 57. 
106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
. s r , note 30. 57. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
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which was developed on women and the law, as
far as I know, was edited by a man. Everybody
was grateful to have it. A lot of people seized on
it and taught the course. The only point I want to
make is now I hear people questioning whether
any man is qualified to teach a course in women
and the law. I'm not expressing an opinion, I'm
simply saying, there's something funny going on.
Now the next example. I remember when there
were serious objections at Harvard Law School
when a white lawyer sought to teach a course on
law and race. I think that white lawyer had
gained most of his experience working for
Thurgood Marshall. People did not see the irony
that existed there. I think that's a little strange.
Personal experience? I also know of a young wo-
man who went to a quite prominent national law
school in another state who wanted to teach one
of these courses on sex and the law. She per-
suaded a fairly conservative administration to let
her teach such a course so she could expose stu-
dents to legal issues as they affect sex , sexual ori-
entation and sexual preference. I was particularly
interested because I have been thinking of teach-
ing such a course, and I have accumulated about
three file cabinets worth of notes which I shared
with her. She was prepared to teach, but very few
students signed up. There were a number of stu-
dents who didn't sign up because they didn't want
anything like that on their transcript, because
they were afraid about the difficulty in getting
jobs. There was another group of students, gay
and lesbian students, I understand, who did not
sign up because they heard that she was a married
woman and they learned that she was straight. It
seems to me there's something funny going on
there which is probably related to personal expe-
rience.
Now, I'll give you just a few examples from
my experience on the LAMBDA Legal Commit-
tee. I remember that there was a sexual harass-
ment case that came to the attention of the Board.
It happened to involve a man who was sexually
harassing another man. There was great conster-
nation about whether the case should be taken.
"We can't take the case because this case involves
gay on gay." That was the way in which one
super intellectual member of that Board at that
time put it-"This case involves gay on gay." To
me, that comment involves stupid on stupid. It
seems to me the whole point is that a gay person
is entitled to the same rights and protections as
anybody else, regardless of how the harm was in-
flicted. That is the point. Equality is the point. I
can also think of an adoption case, where
LAMBDA was asked to be an amicus. The adop-
tion was not the kind of adoption between two
adults that Michael Lavery was talking about, but
a regular old adoption by a single gay man who
wanted to adopt a child. He put a great deal in
his papers about his lack of involvement in gay
liberation organizations and so on and so forth,
and that at the time he was celibate. He was a
gay man. He acknowledged it. And people on
the LAMBDA Board sat there and said, "Why
should we represent him? He's not even proud
about being gay. We shouldn't represent him."
This is another example of stupid on stupid be-
cause this was a man who was being denied the
right to adopt because he was gay and that ought
to be the answer-not his politics or our superior
judgment of what his values ought to be.
PARTICIPANT:
My name is Jim Williams. I am'a law stu-
dent here at Brooklyn Law School. I am not go-
ing to pose a question; I just want to address
something that John said. It comes from my own
personal experience as a law student. He was
talking about someone who was going to teach a
course in lesbian and gay rights and the law. He
was surprised that some students had expressed
that they didn't want to learn that subject from a
straight woman. Although I understand how you
can be repelled by that sort of discrimination, I
can also really identify with the experience of
those law students because I go to a law school
where there are no "out" lesbian or gay profes-
sors. It is very lonely.
SCHNEIDER:
Other comments, responses to that?
PARTICIPANT:
I want to make a comment. I am a recent
graduate of Rutgers Law School. When I heard
that Larry Tribe was going to argue the Bowers 8
case, part of me had a similar feeling. Where are
the lesbian and gay lawyers? I understand that
58. Id.
Tribe has had a lot of experience and he is a well-
respected constitutional scholar. But at the same
time, one of the things I thought developed in all
movements has been autonomy, our own auton-
omy: women's autonomy, gay people's auton-
omy, third world people's autonomy. To have a
straight man get up and argue our cases, well I
felt that he was going to get into certain kinds of
problems or get into discussions like: are we pro-
tected in a motel, or in a car or something like
that. Those of us who've had those kinds of ex-
periences, would probably look at the issues in a
broader fashion than someone who looks at it
from a purely intellectual and non-personal expe-
rience. I think it is important to look at where
our experiences, how our experiences are certain
to be reflected in the kinds of law we choose to do
and the ways we develop argument. I think that
our own experience will make the argument
broader and will reflect the gay movement and
consciousness.
PARTICIPANT:
I'm a first year student at Brooklyn Law
School and, coincidentally, the subject for my
moot court writing course this semester has been
the issue of challenging a sodomy statute on the
grounds that it violated the right to privacy. I
read Bowers, both Tribe's brief and the one that
Mary was involved with. One of the most
profound experiences that I have had, occurred
this past week during my practice session and
even prior to that, in talks with the students who
were representing the appellants who were chal-
lenging the statute. I found that a lot of the stu-
dents' remarks, as well as those of the students
representing the state who wanted to uphold the
statute, were full of outrageous myths about gay
people. I think for some of these people it was the
first time they -took a good hard look at the law
and how it dealt with gay people. Not only that,
but it was the first time that they read some of the
hard facts about AIDS. During one of the prac-
tice session arguments someone said, "This stat-
ute really isn't a problem because it affects so few
people." Since the appellee was arguing, I [as the
appellant] and the professors who were acting as
judges could question the speaker. I said, "Wait a
minute, this is totally unsupported by the record.
You don't know how many people are in this ficti-
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tious state and regardless of that, I think it's ap-
parent that you don't realize the number of gay
people that there are." But that comment and so
many others really were the result of that person's
own experience. I know that some of the things I
was able to bring to the class, although they
might have been too self-conscious-because of
my experience in a relationship similar to that of
the fictitious appellants whom I was represent-
ing-were useful in class discussion. This was ap-
parent to me and to the other people in my writ-
ing class, as a result of my heightened knowledge
about AIDS and how it has affected the gay popu-
lation.
LAVERY:
The question that was raised about Professor
Tribe is similar to the question that I raised about
The Advocate.59 LAMBDA's brief is primarily an
attempt to attack Georgia's brief, which quotes
Paul Cameron. Of course my initial reaction was
certainly that a citation to the New York Times is
essentially the same as a citation to The Advocate.
But when you really get down to it, does it matter
whether it's the New York Times or The Advo-
cate-or whether it was Laurence Tribe's consti-
tutional law text as a secondary reference? Part
of the citation's significance is the reaction it gets.
But one must also ask, "Why is this case in
there?"
I don't have any problem with Laurence
Tribe arguing the case as long as you understand
why he is arguing the case. It doesn't say that
Laurence Tribe is better because he is straight.
Laurence Tribe is an authority on constitutional
law. Whether or not he should be an authority is
a separate question, but he is an authority. He
has a good record before the Supreme Court.
Now, if this is supposed to be entirely a political
exercise, that he is not a lesbian or gay attorney
arguing the case, does not necessarily imply that
there is no lesbian or gay attorney who could ar-
gue the case. It reflects a decision to choose the
person based upon their chance of winning. Be-
neath the question, "Why are you there?" is an-
other question. That question is, "Is winning the
only thing?" Anything that you can do within
certain bounds, is that the purpose? That is, can
we find someone else, not Laurence Tribe, but
someone who, based upon statistical analysis, has
59. See Note 25, supra.
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a greater track-record, a better relationship with
the Justices? We may analyze all these things, as
jury projects do, and come up with a name.
DUNLAP:
Did you know that Gary Hart was selected
as a candidate for the presidency by that very
same type of statistical method? It is interesting,
isn't it?
LAVERY:
As long as you're aware of it.
SCHNEIDER:
It didn't work for Gary Hart.
DUNLAP:
It's interesting for that aspect, too.
LAVERY:
Yes, and I feel the emotion of what you're
saying. Gee, wouldn't it be nice? But that's not
the real world. It is not the real world, at least to
me. To me, the decision that I'm making in this
particular case is balancing what is important and
what is not that important. I may make other de-
cisions. For example, what if we were at trial and
someone said, "Oh no, we have a fag for a lawyer.
What will the judge think? Shouldn't we get
someone who is straight?" The answer is not
clear. This is a narrow question. I try to make it
clear to my clients that, in certain cases, I have a
reputation. If I come in and defend someone,
there is at least some chance the judge, blowing
my reputation out of proportion, is going to say,
"Well this person has been associated with those
causes." Of course judges aren't supposed to take
that into consideration. Ideally, they will put it
out of their minds. But I should make my clients
aware of the possibility that some type of preju-
dice might occur. That is, if I am arguing, the
judge may make connections between this client
and other clients I have represented and arrive at
conclusions which may be harmful to this case.
Clients should consider that factor in deciding
whether or not they want to hire me to represent
them. Do your best to be aware of what those
connections are, and don't let them control you.
Be aware of what they are and then make your
decision.
PARTICIPANT:
I don't think the point that was made earlier
was, "Wouldn't it be nice if we could have a gay
or lesbian attorney up there arguing this case for
us?" I thought her comments went to the issue
that Liz raised when she was discussing Wanrow.
That is, that she could bring to her attorney/cli-
ent relationship experiences from her back-
ground, from her personal experience, from her
feminism, that the male trial attorney could not
bring. She saw things that he didn't see. She was
able to articulate an argument that never oc-
curred to him. The point about lesbian and gay
representation in lesbian and gay cases is that,
perhaps had there been a lesbian or gay lawyer
arguing Bowers, that attorney might not have
conceded that mobile homes were clearly out of
bounds in fourth amendment search and seizure
cases because that's what the Supreme Court has
said. The back seat of a car is also clearly out of
bounds, because cars are moving vehicles. It may
have been a different argument. Privacy
wouldn't; as Mary implied, have been confined to
the house. I thought that that was what this
panel was addressing. How feminists, how gay
and lesbian attorneys address issues, bring their
own personal experiences to issues in a way that is
different when it is their own group that they are
representing. It is the issue of autonomy.
SCHNEIDER:
Let me add to that. I think that that is right.
People see issues differently based on their per-
sonal experience. They perceive the existence of
an issue differently and have an ability to perceive
an issue and to articulate it in ways that are differ-
ent based on experience. Now, that doesn't mean,
for example, that only feminists or only women
can make women's rights arguments. There may
be reasons why in a particular situation you may
choose to have other people make those argu-
ments. There may be reasons why one chooses, as
in the Bowers case, to be represented by Larry
Tribe. That's a political decision and you have to
acknowledge that it's a political decision. It may
be a problematic political decision, precisely be-
cause the notion of privacy to gay people is a
more expansive notion than just homes because of
gay and lesbian life experience. Knowledge of
what "privacy" means to the attorney's gay client
will inform the attorney of what the client is will-
ing to give up.
I don't know, for example, in Bowers how
much dialogue there really was among amici and
Larry Tribe on those issues. I can understand
that it is a very personal choice how much you're
willing to struggle with, expand, and challenge
traditional assumptions. Individuals may demon-
strate a lack of sensitivity to or a different concep-
tion of their role in this process, which may have
class, gender, or other implications.
So there are strategic reasons why in some
contexts you use lawyers who are not necessarily
of that same experience, but you recognize it as
the political decision that it is. You recognize
that in some circumstances there are things that a
main brief can say and other things that you get
across more effectively, politically, by an amicus
brief. You can fashion amici briefs on a number
of different issues, to broaden the perspective of
the main brief. These are strategic decisions re-
garding how one argues a case in its entirety.
These are not just neutral decisions that have no
impact.
When Mike talked about the issue of The Ad-
vocate, I thought of a situation that arose in the
litigation of Coker v. Georgia.' In Coker, the
Supreme Court faced the question of whether the
death penalty was unconstitutional for rape and
ultimately decided that it was. This was a very
hard question. Feminists who were opposed to
the death penalty decided to write an amicus
brief. We didn't want to say that the death pen-
alty shouldn't be for rape because rape isn't im-
portant. We wanted to say that the death penalty
shouldn't be for rape for other reasons, such as
the history of racism in the South and patriarchal
attitudes towards women as property of fathers
and husbands. We unearthed some wonderful
historical material concerning petitions that
groups of women in the South had written at the
time of the lynchings for rape that said, "We
stand against the death penalty for rape because
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it's not really protecting us, it's reinforcing white
male protection of our chastity." A number of
women's rights organizations came together to
work on that brief, and one of the struggles we
had concerned the use of Susan Brownmiller's
book, Against Our Will6 in the amicus brief.
This was 1975, and one of the only empirical and
sociological studies of rape from a woman's per-
spective was Susan Brownmiller's book. Some of
the lawyers were dismayed when we cited it.
They said, "This is not scholarly. This is not ob-
jective." We said, "This is documentation of what
rape is like for the woman victim, and the impact
it has on women as a class." It was important to
use Brownmiller's book in order to support some
of our points.
In Coker we were using Brownmiller's book
because it was important for the Court to see a
view of rape which was more grounded in wo-
men's experience, and which documented the pic-
ture more fully. Those Justices didn't know
about rape. They didn't know what the experi-
ence was like. We were saying that it was impor-
tant for them to know it.62 While Brownmiller's
book may be shocking to them in a certain way,
it's important as a consciousness raising vehicle.
Today there's a lot more traditional authority
which takes the same position as Brownmiller,
such as Susan Estrich's book, Real Rape.63 In
some ways it's harder today. It is not 1974. Off
Our Backs' is not the only material you have.
You have a lot of feminist law review articles.
You have law review articles on gay rights by
people such as Mary Dunlap and Rhonda Ri-
vera65 and a lot of other "legitimate" scholarship
that says similar things. That doesn't mean that
there might not still be a reason to make the
Court read The Advocate in some circumstances.
Larry Tribe's not going to do that. Maybe you
don't even want to do that in the main brief, but
maybe you need to do it in an amicus brief to
show that there is a wide diversity of experience
here. It's important for the Justices to know that
60. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). The amicus brief urged that the
death penalty for rape was "a vestige of an ancient, patriarchal
view of women as the property of men, * * * a reflection of
societal ambivalence toward the woman victim, and * * * a
barrier to proper and vigorous enforcement of rape laws." Brief
Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, the Center
for Constitutional Rights, The National Organization for
Women Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Women's Law
Project, the Center for Women Policy Studies, the Women's
Legal Defense Fund, and Equal Rights Advocates, Inc., at 9.
61. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN,
WOMEN & RAPE (1975).
62. For further discussion of the need for the Supreme Court
to hear different perspectives, see Minow, The Supreme Court
1986 Term-Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV.
10 (1987).
63. S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
64. Off Our Backs is a feminist newspaper.
65. Rhonda Rivera is a professor at Ohio State, who has
written on lesbian and gay rights issues.
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experience. You think about it strategically.
Who should say it? Where and when should it
come in? I don't think you pretend that some of
that other reality doesn't exist and try to "pass."
I don't think the issues that we're talking about
are issues where one can "pass" anymore. I think
we're talking about issues that everyone realizes
are deeply political, problematic, and difficult and
which for me, politically, shape my sense of the
strategy I use in a case. But again, I would sug-
gest that it is something one has to think about in
every situation as a lawyer.
PARTICIPANT:
There is something completely aside from
the present discussion that I wanted to ask
Michael. He talked about the adult adoption
cases that he worked on and I wanted him to ex-
pound on the reasons for adult adoption.
LAVERY:
The reasons come from two areas. First,
from my clients' perspective, it is to create a
structure to fulfill their needs. Second, there are
the legal reasons. The easier area is the legal one.
The New York adoption statutes say that one per-
son may adopt another. In the area of marriage,
the statute doesn't say anything, but the case law
doesn't support same sex marriage. So there is al-
ready an existing barrier to same sex marriage.
Hence, people seeking a "legitimate," legally au-
thorized relationship who don't qualify for mar-
riage may choose adoption.
I did not go out and solicit the adoption cli-
ents. Before the first case, people came to me and
asked me about adoption. It was an idea that
they had come up with. Prior to the case here in
Brooklyn, I had investigated the issue with the
New York Surrogate. I had an interview with the
adoption court. The Surrogate told me, "Oh yes,
it's been done for years." There was this famous
heart surgeon, he couldn't tell me his name, who
adopted his proteg& There was a famous musi-
cian conductor who adopted his "friend." It's
been done a number of times. The Surrogate's
only requirement was that they know about it so
that they could arrange the investigation so it
would return the right results.
His first question when I went in to ask
about adult adoptions was, "Are these two homo-
sexuals?" And I said, "Does it matter?" He said,
"Yes, because if we know it and arrange it, it'll be
okay, but if they hide it we won't approve it."
The Surrogate ended his talk about the heart sur-
geon and the famous composer by saying, "Well,
you know, these people all had their reasons. But
if it were some truck driver on Christopher Street,
we're not going to permit it." My reaction then
was outrage! If you have money and power and
you make a lot of waves, it's okay. But if you're
the average guy on the street, no!
So two people approached me and asked if
they could adopt each other. I told them that I
didn't think it would be approved by the Surro-
gate. As I read the statute, it should be okay, but
in my opinion it was probably a losing case. They
said they were willing to try anyway. They didn't
care about the publicity. They were interested in
trying. I'm that type of lawyer, I was willing to
spend the time, and there was nothing I could see
that was clearly against it. They weren't afraid of
the publicity, so we tried it. It was an idea that a
number of people had always raised, so we de-
cided, let's see what happens, let's run it up the
flagpole.
I went to the court and got the papers. They
didn't seem to know what was going on. They
never did adult adoptions. The woman in the
clerk's office said, "Gee, if you know Frank Sina-
tra, tell him he could adopt me anytime." So
there wasn't any problem. They weren't terribly
shocked. We filled out the papers. That was it.
In the case that I appealed, the individuals
had a number of reasons for wanting the adop-
tion. One of the men was a photographer. His
life's work were his negatives, his slides-all that
he had produced. He is fairly well-known in the
particular field that he's involved in. He knew a
number of other people, also artists, who had
tried to will their estates, their slides, everything
to their lovers. Either the family destroyed the
work, there were challenges to the wills, or there
were long hassles. These individuals wanted
something to ensure that their work passed to
their lovers, or at least gave them a better chance
than just a will. They wanted a legal recognition
of a relationship-whatever that relationship
might be. Ultimately, I would suggest that their
main reason was testamentary.
My argument before the courts has been that
prior to the Victorian Era or the Post-Victorian
Era, most adoptions, in the Roman tradition,
were done in order to add to the blood line.
Victorians did not adopt children. After all, you
didn't know who this person's parents were. You
didn't know what sort of people they came from.
If you were a charitable Victorian gentleman or a
charitable Victorian family, you may have taken
in a child and become that child's guardian, but
you didn't adopt. Adoption is a relatively recent
idea of bringing into your blood line people of un-
known and certainly untested parentage. Adop-
tion had always been for the continuation of rela-
tionships. That's why I argued it.
PARTICIPANT:
The reason I asked this question is because
you had stated earlier that if someone could give
you a good reason for a gay marriage, you would
certainly litigate it. And I can't understand what
the difference is between the arguments that were
posed before the court in the adoption case that
couldn't have been solved by gay marriage. Sec-
ondly, I suggest that it's an abuse of the judicial
system to bring a case solely because the statute
doesn't specifically prohibit the adoption of an-
other adult. It is a waste of time. Certainly if you
were litigating a gay marriage, although you have
some precedents against you, you have the same
argument that the New York statute doesn't spe-
cifically mention a marriage between a male and a
female.
LAVERY:
You hit on the crux of a whole lot of things.
That is, how do you interpret that which is not
explicit? Should it be: a) that which is not explic-
itly permitted is thereby prohibited, or b) that
which is not prohibited is permitted? Karst dis-
cusses this" in terms of the concept of personal
privacy. Can a court blithely say that the lifestyle
of a lesbian mother will affect a child negatively,
or does someone have to prove that the lifestyle of
the woman will negatively affect the child? The
court may accept as a given that sodomy is an act
which has been disapproved throughout the cen-
turies and is therefore injurious to family life. Or
the court may say, "Show us the proof that it is
injurious." Are you saying, "It's a waste of time;
how dare these people come before the court?"
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PARTICIPANT:
No, I'm not saying that. You were saying
that if a gay couple came to you with a real reason
for getting married, or a good solid reason for get-
ting married, you would take the case. I'm say-
ing, weren't all the gay adoption cases, in effect, a
way to circumvent the absence of a gay marriage?
If that couple had approached you and, instead of
asking if you could arrange an adoption, had said,
"We want to be married," why wouldn't you have
taken that case? It seems to achieve the same
end.
LAVERY:
I'm really not an advocate of gay marriage.
To me, and I stress "to me," marriage has certain
parameters as an institution which are different
from those of adoption. The effect of an adoption
cannot be changed by the individuals, as it can in
marriage. Marriage requires the intervention of
the state. They are two historically different tra-
ditions. In many states, though not in New York,
adoption is solely a matter of contract. It is -a
contractual relationship. In marriage, there is the
concept of contract but there are also all those
things about the state standing behind the mar-
riage bed.
SCHNEIDER
Mike, are you saying that the reason why
you wouldn't have framed the case as marriage as
opposed to adoption if these folks came to you is
because...
LAVERY:
I think gay marriage is a loser.
SCHNEIDER:
All right, that's what I was trying to say.
These folks came to you and they said, "We want
to solve the ambiguity of our relationship through
some form of legalization." Let's say that they
were more explicit, they said, "I'd like to adopt
my lover." You could have said, "I think a more
effective way would be through marriage." Did
you choose adoption because you believed it was a
more persuasive argument?
66. See. e.g.. Karst, Kenneth L., The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
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PARTICIPANT:
First, it was the client who chose adoption.
And second, I did not suggest marriage because,
in my opinion, it is a losing proposition. At the
present time, considering case law both here and
everywhere else, gay marriage is a loser. We had
as much of a chance of getting a gay marriage ap-
proved as a cellulose cat has of chasing an asbes-
tos rat through hell. But we had a fair chance of
getting a gay adoption approved.
PARTICIPANT:
I realize that it was a loser based on past
cases. All I'm saying is that the rationale is the
same. And Mike said that if anyone came to him
with a good reason for a gay marriage, he would
take it.
LAVERY:
Yes, if someone would convince me. Most of
these cases are done with little or no fee. In terms
of fighting and spending time and effort, it's got to
be something I believe in. I'm not going to make





I don't have a question, it's only a comment
that Mary Dunlap made at the NYU workshop
on gay and lesbian law. It was something that
impressed me very much. It was very beautiful.
She said, "Imagine yourselves not here among
your peers, your gay and lesbian peers, but on the
other side. On the side of those people that want
to roast you on the stake. Imagine how they
would fight against you and what they would say
against you. That would give you a sense that
what we should be doing here is not fighting each
other but discussing strategies to fight to shape
some progress." I think that it is a very illuminat-
ing discussion, but at least the tone is too hostile
for me. I'd like to suggest that we should change
the discussion to the issue of empowerment and
directions for change.
My name is Joan Gibbs. I'm on the national
staff at the ACLU. One of the things I wanted to
raise, which you just began to hit on, is about neg-
ative comments made about Kluger's book, Sim-
ple Justice.67 In my mind, that book and some of
the things Mary Dunlap raised created a tension.
One of the good things in Kluger's book, for peo-
ple who haven't read it, is the way he documents
the strategy that the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund used in getting to Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.68 They started out very systematically, I
think, with law schools and churches, and then
they moved on. And what I'm wondering, having
worked in the NAACP, having had that as my
model for all of my years of thinking about being
a lawyer, is that maybe we should litigate system-
atically. Then the radical part of me says, "That's
crazy." We should just go ahead, and I know
that what you're saying is right. The thought of
Tribe arguing Bowers really didn't bother me, be-
cause I knew that he was the one who was going
to be selected. But in writing briefs, I've had ar-
guments about the use of the term "homosexual."
I have actually sat down and worked on briefs
with lawyers from various organizations and have
debated the use of the term "homosexual" versus
lesbian and gay rights. So I'm wondering which
of those two paths we should be following as a
model. At times I sense LAMBDA goes between
the LAMBDA Legal Defense Fund model, the
strategic five year plan, versus the automatic, let's
go full speed ahead argument. I vacillate between
those two principal models.
DEWITT GREGORY:
Nobody knows the answer to that. It's going
to be debated on and on. We've heard two sides
of it. It depends upon a lot of things, some of
which we may not even be conscious of. The
more I listen to this discussion, the more I con-
clude that many of our differences are genera-
tional. As each year goes by, I think that about
more and more things.
I've had the same argument with people at
LAMBDA about whether, in a particular brief,
one should use the term "gay" or use the term
"homosexual." This was a few years ago. Now,
at the time, I was not even sure the court would
68. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
LAVERY:
67. KLUGER, supra note 43.
clearly understand what was being argued if the
term of choice was used. It seems to me, that if I
knew which term would result in a favorable deci-
sion, that's the term I would use. But I would get
a favorable decision. They would not even use
the term if it would get a favorable decision.
They would prefer to use the term which would
raise consciousness and revolutionize a racist, sex-
ist, homophobic society. I simply don't think that
revolution is best waged in the courtroom. I
don't think you have the audience for it. I don't
know what the answers are. I simply have a point
of view and certain values. And I find some of
the movement rhetoric empty, flawed and some-
times just dead wrong. Particularly when people
speak as if they know what is true. There was a
time when I knew a great deal more than I know
now. And as the old rock song says: "But I was
so much older then, I'm younger than that now."
I find that I'm sure of less and less. I know that
much of what I hear other folks say that they're
sure of is not true. That is why I really think we
ought to question and examine.
I don't relate to litigation as political theatre.
I just don't relate to that. My training and experi-
ence suggests that litigation, the kind of litigation
I'm interested in, involves advancing the rights of
individual clients. Now if you have a client who
wants to make a political point, fine. But in my
view of the ethical obligations of a lawyer, you
never make your political point at the expense of
the client, or try to persuade the client that the
political point is more important than the client's
right. I say those things because I have seen law-
yers do that. If I were to joke around I would say
something like "In every poverty lawyer there's a
raving maniac struggling to get out." But I'll be
serious and say that that has happened, and it re-
ally is a danger. I have seen self-styled radical
lawyers dealing with political issues at the ex-
pense of the individual client. When that hap-
pens, I think it is an abomination.
DUNLAP:
I am a self-styled radical lawyer who has
committed the ultimate transgression in that I be-
lieve that one can seek favorable decisions and
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raise consciousness and revolutionize the legal
system all in one grand fell swoop. I will offer
you as an example my representation of a rela-
tively unknown client in a case called Lesbian!
Gay Freedom Day Parade Committee v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service.69 There was a
controversy as to whether they were called gay or
lesbian/gay. In this case, we went to federal
court in San Francisco in 1981, contending that
the INS's policy of interpreting Section 11 82(a)(4)
of the Immigration and Naturalization Act7" to
exclude homosexuals from immigrating to the
United States violated my client's first amend-
ment rights. I heard the word "loser" in that case
more often than I've heard it on this panel. Virtu-
ally everyone said, "That argument is a dead
loser. It's the most absurd thing we've heard."
Just about every self-styled moderate gay rights
litigator in the San Francisco Bay area was buzz-
ing with how completely outrageous and ridicu-
lous such litigation would be. It was. It was out-
rageous, ridiculous, foolish, foolhardy, daring,
challenging and delightful.
Three things made it delightful for me. One,
that we conceived that the first amendment em-
powered my clients to hear from foreign nationals
who were gay and lesbian, drawing from dictum
in the original opinion about immigration of gays
and lesbians, Boutilier v. INS.7 In that case a gay
Canadian was deported, thanks to the decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1967. The Circuit
Court, however, had talked about how if the INS
means what it says about keeping homosexuals
out of the United States, then Leonardo da Vinci,
Michelangelo, Sappho and other interesting peo-
ple wouldn't be able to come here.72 So we
thought maybe we could get a judge to listen to a
list of the people who would be affected by the
exclusion of gays and lesbians from the United
States. Nothing was more immediate in our minds
than educating, using the litigation to educate.
Now we could play all day with terms like "revo-
lutionize." I think that the word has an obvious
red taint. I like to use it for that reason, because
it gets everybody up in their chair at 4:30, but the
truth of the matter was, the primary verb in terms
of activity in this litigation was "educate." Lots
69. 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982), affirmed in part and
vacated in part as moot, sub nom, Hill v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
70. 8 U.S.C. 1182 (a)(4) explicitly prohibits aliens who are
"afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, or
a mental defect[,]" from receiving visas or being admitted into
the United States.
71. 387 U.S. 118 (1968).
72. Boutilier v. INS, 363 F.2d 488, 497-98 (2d Cir. 1966)
(Moore, J., dissenting).
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and lots of gay people didn't know that they were
supposed to answer yes to the question, "Are you
afflicted with a psychopathic personality?"
We had two clients, one from England and
one from Mexico who had the audacity to come
and say, "I'm a homosexual." The people at the
airport said to one of them, "Well, we've got to
get you a doctor." He responded, "No, I'm not
sick. I'm a homosexual." They had to get a doc-
tor to certify that he was excludable. They had to
go to the Navy to get one because no civilian doc-
tor would do the job. The absolutely vital key to
our success in the suit was .... I would love to
say it was my advocacy. I would love to say it
was my client's bravado and willingness to take
on the legal system, to take the bull by the horns
and realize that one's politics are inseparable from
the law, whether they're conservative law and
conservative politics or radical law and radical
politics. It was none of those things. It was U.S.
District Judge Robert P. Aguilar" who pro-
ceeded to accept and advance the idea that the
first amendment really did provide a right for
U.S. citizens to hear from foreign gay and lesbian
persons.
Indeed, ,we don't know Larry Tribe's sexual
orientation. I don't know John's. I don't know
Mike's. I happen to know Liz's because we're
friends. I know some of yours because I know
you. Everyone's premise is that Larry Tribe is
straight. It ain't mine. What's key there is not
what he is, but how "out" he is.- It's not irrele-
vant. It's crucial. It's just as crucial as when
Thurgood Marshall stood before the Supreme
Court of the United States as a black man and
argued Brown v. the Board of Education.74 It is as
crucial as when Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued
Reed v. Reed" before the U.S. Supreme Court as
a woman. Indeed Rehnquist knew how crucial it
was because when Ruth Ginsburg came back on
another occasion to argue against the exclusion of
women from juries,76 Rehnquist supposedly
leaned over and said to her at the end of the argu-
ment, "I take it you're not satisfied with Susan B.
Anthony's picture on the dollar." If you would
like to try to explain that situation to me without
reference to gender, I'd love to listen.
The point is that our identities are vital to
the directions in which we go and we cannot stay
in our closets, whatever they're made of, whether
the outside reads Harvard or anything else. We
cannot stay in our closets. That is not to say that
we all have to walk out of the closet in lock-step
fashion with a label across our chest. But we can-
not stay in them. No one can afford to stay in
them.
That's what I'm getting at when I talk about
translating personal experience into legal, polit-
ical and educational strategy. My clients stuck
their necks out, and I stuck my neck out, and
Judge Aguilar" stuck his neck way out-because
you know what the judges on the Ninth Circuit
do when they get a case that's favorable to gays.
They immediately embark upon a speculation
about the sexual orientation of the judge that
cited it favorably. "Ah, the guy's gotta be queer.
He ruled for those queers." That's the level of
unsophistication at which we will remain if we
don't come out, if we don't speak up. I don't
mean by "coming out" some sort of parody of the
only way to come out, which is an act by which
one comes out and it's all done. Coming out is a
life-long process. Recovery from discrimination
is a life-long, society-wide process.
On the airplane coming here I sat down with
somebody who immediately engaged in the same
activity that our earlier exercise involved. They
sized me up. Who is this? What is this person?
What's she made of? I can do a lot of different
things about that. Sometimes I choose to pre-
serve my intellectual privacy because I want to
read or something, so I exchange a few pleasan-
tries and I don't engage the person in conversa-
tion. They have the same choice. Sometimes
when they ask me what I do I say, "I'm a lesbian
and gay rights lawyer. I also do women's rights
and I also represent disabled people," and their
eyes widen for the most part and they're sur-
prised. Then, very often we have a good, fulfil-
ling, enriching, moving conversation, in which
73. The federal district court judge presiding over Gay
Parade Comm. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
74. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
75. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed v. Reed, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, who is now a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, argued that the State of Idaho
could not give a preference to fathers over mothers in the
administration of the estates of deceased minors. Ginsburg
succeeded in having the U.S. Supreme Court apply the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection in favor
of women, for the first time in the history of the Court or the
amendment.
76. See generally, Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
77. See supra note 73.
they tell me something equally important about
themselves.
All of this is not to loft genderism or sexual
orientation identification above all the other im-
portant things we can say about ourselves. It is to
say that Adrienne Rich78 is right about truth.
Truth is an incredibly powerful thing. If we bull-
shit each other about who we are, and we come
back with arguments which fake facts about the
real relationships involved, which, with all re-
spect, is what I heard in the debate about adult
adoption if we come back with hostility, then
somehow we missed the gist. In that sense there
is a common premise here, that truth is good, that
truth is not to be avoided. We tell all different
kinds of truth. We differ with each other pro-
foundly about how to tell it. But if we differ
about whether truth matters, then we have a dif-
ference that is engulfing. I can't bridge that. I
can't bridge the gulf with a gay lawyer who turns
up on the other side of my INS case, who works
for the government and whose job, he "guesses,"
is to keep people out of the country. I can't deal
with a gay lawyer who is among those on the
other side of my Gay Olympics case79 whose job
is to squish my little Gay Olympics clients in the
name of the U.S. Olympic Committee, because,
after all, we know where the power lies. I can't
deal with the idea that the real world says Lau-
rence Tribe is greater authority on gay people
than openly gay people.
Let's unpackage that. The point was made
and made well by Mike; how come you people all
did my exercise? I said, "Gender these," and you
did them. By the way, I did not say call them
male or female. I said, "Identify their sex." I
thought some people would come up with some
new sexes. I am ever in search. I've written an
article on the subject."a It is my view that there
are very many-more than two sexes, but the legal
system, as usual, can only see two. It's not a sur-
prise. In any case, what I'm getting at is this. I
have incredible respect and admiration for Lau-
rence Tribe. When his book8 ' first came out I was
in Austin, Texas, also first coming out, and I dove
into this treatise and thought, "God, this needed
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to be written for a long, long time." Tribe wrote
this beautiful book. I wrote him a letter. I said,
"I love your book. It's beautiful." I love the pref-
ace, which says that it is fine ethical scholarship,
to say where you're coming from. I say, right, it
certainly is.
Ultimately, the most successful advocates
before the U.S. Supreme Court (and I'm talking
not just about favorable decisions, but processes
which give the Court the grounds upon which to
base the next decision, when they can be a little
braver perhaps), are advocates who unite the
emotional and the intellectual, the political and
the personal. Successful advocates don't give in
to phony debates about whether men's views of
law are better than women's, or whether Blacks'
views are better than Whites', or even whether
conservatives' views are better than radicals'. We
engage in phony debates out of fear of getting to
more painful feelings, in and out of the law.
I want to offer just one more example of why
it is so important to own up to how legal and fact
situations affect us. This is an example involving
the beloved and difficult William 0. Douglas who
wrote an opinion in a case called Kahn v.
Shevin,82 a little known case except for those who
take exception to sexism in the law and have
dwelt on it. It is a case involving whether or not
Florida's tax exemption for widows was constitu-
tional. Douglas did this incredible turnaround.
In Frontiero,8 Douglas was with the plurality
saying that sex is suspect, just like race. Sex is
different from race, their histories are different,
but in constitutional terms, these things are the
same. When sex is a proxy for discrimination,
you can't have it. In Kahn, Douglas turns around
and upholds Florida's tax exemption for widows,
despite the very clear demonstration that there
were plenty of poor men and that the proper ana-
lytical variable was poverty and not gender.
What you gotta know about Bill Douglas is what
he says in his autobiography, 4 which is that when
his father died and he was very young, his mother
got ripped off by a lawyer. The lawyer took the
five thousand dollars in life insurance that his fa-
ther left behind. I think that William 0. Douglas
78. See RICH, supra note 52.
79. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic
Committee, 107 S. Ct. 312 (1987).
80. M. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual
Minorities: A Crisis of the Male/Female Dichotomy, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (1979).
81. TRIBE, supra note 30.
82. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
83. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
84. W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN (1974).
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had a tremendous stereotypical attachment to the
plight of widows arising from personal experi-
ence, which interfered with his ability to reach a
doctrine of true equality and embrace it in that
case. Now, let's not fault him and let's not bela-
bor it and let's not pound William 0. Douglas
into the ground. The point I'm getting at is that
none of us here can pretend that it isn't terribly
important what we're doing at this workshop.
Yes, I agree that it is absolutely a truth that per-
sonal experience translates into and affects our
legal strategies, no matter how conscious we are.
What we've been doing today is trying to make
ourselves more conscious, and that is different,
and that is special and that isn't everyday legal
education. It should be, and it should've been
long ago, and it's gonna be, as long as I'm educat-
ing.
SCHNEIDER:
Let me take Mary's last message and give an-
other example of it and then I'll turn to John, un-
less other people want to speak. Mary is raising
the question of dealing with who we really are.
This is something that is not only important in
the context we're discussing, but in the context of
arguing to judges. Mary's example of Douglas
and Kahn is a very good example. I wanted to
tell you a story based on my own experience in a
recent New Jersey Supreme Court case called
State v. Kelly,"5 which I think reveals a very simi-
lar point. State v. Kelly involved the issue of the
admissibility of expert testimony on "battered
woman syndrome" in a case involving a woman
who had killed her husband. I worked on this
case while I was at the Constitutional Litigation
Clinic at Rutgers Law School with a number of
my students. We wrote an amicus brief and peti-
tioned the court to let me argue the case as ami-
cus. This was very unusual, but the court granted
my motion to argue. It seemed that this was an
important opportunity to take some of the argu-
ments which we were developing as amicus and
present them before the court.
In the course of researching the issues that
we were going to present, we discovered an inter-
esting opinion written by Justice Wilentz, who, as
many of you know, is Chief Justice of the New
Jersey Supreme Court and a very progressive Jus-
tice. He is someone who is concerned about wo-
men's issues. He convened a very broad ranging
Task Force on Women in the courts of the state
of New Jersey. 6 In the course of our research we
found an opinion of his in a case involving a man
who killed his wife. In this case, State v. Powell, 87
there was nothing in the record to explain why
the defendant might have killed his wife. Justice
Wilentz supplied some explanation on appeal that
made the man's actions seem reasonable. As we
considered why he might have done this, we won-
dered about the issue of "male bonding." We per-
ceived that in a situation involving a male defend-
ant who had killed his wife, this Justice, who's as
conscious about women's issues as you could ex-
pect a Justice to be, might have reflexively identi-
fied on some level with this man and developed an
explanation for his actions.
Now, the importance of that, as I thought
about that, was what we were asking the court to
do in State v. Kelly was to recognize that the bat-
tered woman who killed her husband had nobody
in the courtroom who was explaining her actions,
who could identify with her and explain her expe-
rience and translate it to the jury. The jury would
have trouble understanding her because of myths
and misconceptions about battered women. They
couldn't hear her story. They needed somebody
else to translate and legitimate it to them, because
nobody was "female-bonding" or "battered wo-
man-bonding" with her in the courtroom. The
jury wasn't likely to do that.
Well, I thought about that and I thought,
"Could I possibly talk directly to the court about
this issue when I argue this case?" So, as we nor-
mally did in the Constitutional Litigation Clinic
seminar, we discussed our current cases, and
talked about the strategy. I raised the question of
talking directly to the court about this issue to the
students in the seminar and to my colleagues on
the faculty. Some people said, "Are you nuts?
You can't do that. Justice Wilentz is clearly sym-
pathetic. Why alienate him? It can only alienate
him to raise the issue of his own experience and
what it means to really have someone who is
thinking about the defendant's situation in the
courtroom. It can't help." I thought about that
85. 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984).
86. Loftus, The First Year Report of the New Jersey Supreme
Court Task Force on Women in the Courts--June 1984, 9
WOMEN'S RTs. L. RPTR. 129 (1986).
87. 84 N.J. 305, 419 A.2d 406 (1980).
and I thought, okay, that's probably the wiser ap-
proach. I'll try to see if I can do that.
The argument ended up taking several hours
and they let me speak for quite a long time. Jus-
tice Wilentz was pushing to know why it was nec-
essary to admit expert testimony on Battered Wo-
men's Syndrome. Despite the better judgment of
my colleagues and my students, I decided that it
was important to answer directly since he was
talking to me directly. The court had let me ar-
gue the case as amicus knowing full well what my
perspective was. I thought I should address the
issue directly. In my experience, the best aspect of
appellate argument is talking directly to the court
by responding to the real concerns, not hiding be-
hind the strengths and weaknesses of the case. So
I did. I explained to Justice Wilentz my reading
of this case, State v. Powell. I explained to him
that I thought he might have unwittingly and un-
consciously identified with the male defendant in
that case, and that we needed an expert witness to
translate the battered woman's experience in the
same way. He seemed very surprised. He didn't
really respond. It was hard for me to evaluate its
effect. He didn't seem hostile afterward. He
looked moved. It seemed to have gotten to him in
some way.
Well, we won the case. The New Jersey
Supreme Court issued an excellent broad-ranging
opinion written by Justice Wilentz. State v. Kelly
is the most useful opinion on the use of expert tes-
timony in a Battered Syndrome case. I hope that
speaking directly to him and suggesting that he
consider something that he otherwise might not
have thought about had helped. The issue of sex
discrimination had not been discussed before the
court in State v. Powell. If it had been, Justice
Wilentz might have been sensitive to it. In State
v. Powell, the legal issue had taken another form.
It focused on imperfect self-defense and the court
wasn't thinking about sex bias. Justice Wilentz
wasn't thinking about why he might have subcon-
sciously identified with a male defendant.
State v. Kelly could have had a different re-
sult. There's no question about it. Talking di-
rectly to a Justice was a calculated risk. I am not
suggesting that it's a strategy one should adopt in
every case. I am using it as an example to say
that in some circumstances, and frequently in ap-
pellate argument (which really is your opportu-
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nity to speak directly to the court), one has the
opportunity to deal directly with what you antici-
pate the biases and attitudes of the judges to be.
It is an opportunity to grapple directly with the
court's biases. I don't think that I was confronta-
tional or hostile. My argument was, "This is hard
stuff and I understand that you're grappling with
it. Let me give you an example of how important
it is to have somebody there in the courtroom,
thinking about the situation that the defendant is
in. Think about whether you were able to relate
differently to the Powell situation. You may have
been there for Powell, even subconsciously. No-
body was there for Gladys Kelly." I think that
this is an example of the way in which sensitivity
to personal experience can be important from the
perspective of both advocate and judge. Now I
said I would turn to John.
DEWITT GREGORY:
Thank you. I guess to say what I said earlier
in another way would be to say, "there's not truth
in here.". There are a variety of opinions. There's
a fellow on our faculty, one of the first things he
tells his classes is, "Don't believe anything I say.
Don't believe anything anyone says." Sometimes
he tells his classes things that aren't true so that
they can't simply go away believing what he has
said. I think that's good advice here also. If
someone comes to hear things which makes them
comfortable and to avoid disagreement which
may be perceived as hostility or lack of love, I can
imagine what the disagreements must have been
when people were preparing for a case like Brown
v. Board of Education.88 I think it is also possible
to disagree very strongly with someone's point of
view without necessarily despising the person. I
have very little time to spend despising people.
I really don't think that it was critical that a
black man argued Brown. If he dropped dead the
night before and a qualified white person argued
it, I doubt the decision would have been different.
As a political matter, I can see that it is incredibly
important. I suspect that one of the reasons I re-
alize it so strongly is because of my personal expe-
rience, being black. I'm not going to get into all
the war stories, some of which I was telling out in
the hall about having lips too thick to play the
trumpet and having my kid brother's head rubbed
for luck by the Wonder Bread man.
88. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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All I'm suggesting is that I don't think we
should make such a lot of this. I guess I can tol-
erate more than some of the panelists. I mean the
business of not being able to deal with a gay attor-
ney on the other side of a case, well, I really don't
understand that. Maybe I don't understand it be-
cause in a way maybe that condemns me, since I
was representing wardens in some of the prison
cases which convicted black folks. I'm really not
sure. This whole business of "We must come out,
we must come out." As I said at the beginning,
that's what bothers me the most. The implica-
tions that if we talk about ways to translate per-
sonal experience we'll end up saying to people,
you must translate personal experience and it is
your obligation to do this, that and the other. I
don't like musts. I don't like oughts. I suppose
that I think people ought to do pretty much
whatever they damn please, as long as it's not
hurting somebody else. I can't see why some peo-
ple should tell other people what they ought to be
doing. I mean I always resent that when that
happens.
I was up for tenure some years ago and one
of the people who thought that he was going to be
very influential in the tenure decision said to me,
"John, you are not doing the kinds of things you
should be doing in terms of your outside activi-
ties." Conceding that I was active in the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union and a number of other
things, he said, "You should be representing mi-
grant workers." I found that insulting. I con-
sider that to be a form of the new slavery-Not
only when Whites are telling Blacks what they
ought to do, but when Blacks are telling Blacks
what to do, or when gay people are telling other
gay people, who- happen to be lawyers, what they
must do.
I resent it when a black student comes to me
feeling terribly guilty because of having had an of-
fer for a job in a large firm, and other black stu-
dents, probably of less talent, are saying, "You
shouldn't go there because you know that's help-
ing the enemy. You shouldn't be representing
corporations, you should be going into the com-
munity." Well if somebody wants to work in the
community, and I have, that is that person's busi-
ness. But if somebody doesn't want to, and
doesn't want to use personal experience in the
way that has been suggested, it seems to me that it
is that person's right. I guess that's the reason
there's only one organization which I have found
no problems with, no questions with, no conflict
about and that's the Civil Liberties Union because
I suppose that's the principle that they will al-
ways defend. They're never telling anybody what
to do. They are simply saying you are free to do
what you wish, as long as it doesn't harm any-
body else and we will protect you all the time.
Politics is personal. Politics is a matter of choice.
What people are thinking is good politics today, is
bad politics another time. I want to tell you to




I have a question for any one of the panelists.
When you are before the court and you're arguing
on a topic in which personal experience has gen-
erated a great deal of emotion for you, how do
you control that and channel it in an effective
way, given the impositions that are placed on you
in the setting, the decorum of the court room, def-
erence to the judge and opposing counsel. It was
a problem I ran into during my moot court prac-
tice and it confronts other students as well.
DUNLAP:
It's a tricky balance. There are as many dif-
ferent styles that can make an argument effective
as there are people in this room. I can tell right
away when a lawyer does not believe in her or his
position. I can feel it. So in that way, the passion
and emotions that we're talking about today are
crucial in advocacy. But the panel has focused on
the visible thing, maybe the more rewarding as-
pects of litigation are preparing the brief and
comprising the conceptual position.
Another place where the balance between
one's own beliefs and experiences and one's law-
yerly equipment comes into play is with a client,
advising a client about options. It is so easy when
a client trusts you to persuade them in a given
direction but not as easy to live with the conse-
quences. It seems to me that the point at which
the lawyers are most likely to disempower their
clients is at that juncture of projecting their per-
sonal selves. I like, for that reason, what Liz said
consistently, which was that she was not Yvonne
Wanrow. I am not my Lesbian and Gay Freedom
Day Parade clients. I have a very real bond with
them and I don't mind a bit that the court hap-
pens to know that I'm an open lesbian. I will use
that; it will be a source of strength for me. That's
how I want it to be in my life and your lives and
that's what I mean about coming out. To
whatever extent anyone might've understood
what I was saying about "shoulds" and "musts,"
I was speaking rhetorically, in the sense that these
are things I believe we must do. I am no more or
no less than one person saying these things.
DEWITT GREGORY:
Maybe I am out of touch with reality be-
cause I have really not had the sense that in order
to represent a client effectively that I've had to
believe in a client's cause. Of course I go back to
my experience of representing a warden of Attica
prison and nothing I did before that and nothing I
did after would suggest that I believed in the
cause of the warden in Attica prison. I don't be-
lieve that when I argued or opposed habeas corpus
petitions, time after time in the Second Circuit, I
don't believe that Mary could have detected
whether or not I believed in the cause of avoiding
jail releases. I really don't. I really do believe
that if you are a good lawyer and you're reason-
ably smart, Which is not too hard to be, and rea-
sonably articulate and work hard enough, and the
cause is not repugnant to you, that you can repre-
sent causes whether you're necessarily committed
to them passionately or not.
As for the question of arguing before an ap-
pellate court, I give you a simple answer, which
some might even think is simple-minded. I know
that there are some things which I have to watch
out for when I'm arguing an appeal. What I do is
write myself a little note so that I don't do those
things. For example, when I get emotionally in-
volved, which is usually not with causes but with
my own rhetoric, I start to talk too loud. So I
write myself a note to quiet down and I put it on
the podium. I also write myself a note to smile
occasionally and not get so intense as I'm talking
to the court. If you're going to do appellate advo-
cacy these are simple techniques. I know they're
not idle notions and all that, and you'll get differ-
ent kinds of answers from intellectuals than from
me. I'm just a country school teacher and that's
the best advice I can give.
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SCHNEIDER:
Any other questions? Go ahead, you haven't
spoken before.
PARTICIPANT:
I'm just speaking as a country law student. I
would like to request that some of the law profes-
sors here think about their students who are les-
bian and gay and feminist, and not skip those por-
tions of the cases that deal with their lives if they
should come up in the courses because there's not
enough time. Usually that's the excuse that we've
been given. "There's not enough time to do these
cases. You can read them at home." No one
reads what's not assigned if they read at all. It's
very difficult to discuss these cases. If this is the
field in which we have chosen to work, it's very
disturbing because we don't have one who is will-
ing to talk about these issues. I don't think I'm
getting the proper legal education. I don't care
how smart I am or how logical I learn to be or
how well I learn to think as a lawyer. I want
some substance with it and I want it to stop being
ignored.
DEWITT GREGORY:
It is not ignored in my classes, you may be
sure.
PARTICIPANT:
That's very good, I'm very glad to hear it.
As a dean, I would hope you would argue for that
in all the courses where these issues come up.
DEWITT GREGORY:
A dean doesn't tell professors what to teach.
PARTICIPANT:
No, I didn't say that. I'm not asking for
that. But I think that we often hear how impor-
tant it is to have both sides of the argument to be
able to make a well-informed decision. When one
side is constantly left out I find it difficult to learn
how to make those decisions and arguments.
PARTICIPANT:
I want to address myself to Professor Greg-
ory. One of my questions has always been why
some people do certain things. For instance, why
did we actually follow Mary's command to "gen-
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der" when we're free not to do it. It's because of
the situation here that we did it, that is, we
obeyed. For me, it is a mystery how there can be
several million people who will follow the com-
mands of government and kill other people even
though they may not believe in what they're fight-
ing, just because someone told them this is what
they should do. The same thing applies to law-
yers. There's an ethical code that says you have
to represent your client to the best of your ability
and this is true. You're also perfectly capable of
making decisions and looking for certain kinds of
cases which will advance a certain political inter-
est that you have. I don't think a lawyer is neu-
tral. I don't think the law is neutral. I was gay
and I was Hispanic and a minority before I came
to law school, and coming out I'm still gay and
Hispanic. I think I will try my best both as an
individual and as a lawyer to advance the inter-
ests of those two minorities to which I belong. I
will not deny representation to the client, for in-
stance, if he's assigned to me even though his in-
terests may be contrary to mine. But I will damn
well look for cases and damn well do everything I
can to further the interests of my minorities. I
think that is what Mary is getting at. But I think
people must be political, must take a stand, must
be personal and must be emotional about these is-
sues. Because there's no such thing as objectivity.
If you're being "objective" you're taking a side
without realizing it.
DEWITT GREGORY:
I think there is objectivity, I just don't think
there is neutrality and most of the time people say
they are neutral. There is no neutrality but I
think there can be objectivity.
DUNLAP:
Sounds like a grounds for an agreement here.
I think we have come to one agreement this after-
noon.
PARTICIPANT:
This doesn't relate directly to the law. It re-
lates more to professionalism and the fight to be
open in any professional study. I'm currently
working for a federal civil service agency. I am
also in my fourth year in the evening at Rutgers
Law School. Rutgers is a very open, a very pro-
gressive school. It's been a terrific experience. In
my workplace there are between ten and twelve
gay people on the staff that I know. I am the only
one that is open. I'm the one who gets all the gay
flak. I'm the one who always has to be the gay
spokesperson. I'm the one who always gets the
sick jokes. The only people in my office who are
really afraid of me are the other eleven gay peo-
ple. And really, talking before about what we
should and shouldn't be doing, we shouldn't tell
people they should be coming out. We shouldn't
tell people they should be up front. Damn it. I
am really tired of carrying that burden by myself.
I say that to these people, and they just look at me
and say "you're right" or "you're idealistic" or
"you're alienating everybody." They're cop-outs.
It saddens me that this is a representation of the
gay community. Sometimes I get really sick of
the gay community because there are so many
people who are proud that they pass. They went
to a job interview and no one suspected. No one
suspected; anything. They took a woman to the
Christmas party and passed as straight. This is
just a peisonal comment. I am really tired of it.
DUNLAP:
I'm glad you made that comment. It was
very powerful.
SCHNEIDER:
Comments? Other reactions? I don't know.
The only thing that I can say in response to that is
it seems to me that that's very poignant and a
very telling note that comes full circle to where
we started today. That separation really is hateful
and how difficult it is to be in a situation where
you are not able to fully express, through your
work and through your way of living, the numer-
ous dimensions of which you are as a person. I
think what we're setting to do in our discussion
today is to try to explicate and talk about the
ways in which, as lawyers and as human beings,
we can bring both sides of that painful separation
together. It doesn't respond to the poignancy of
the problem you're talking about, but it does at
least say something about the on going struggle.
If we talk more directly to each other about the
difficulty of that, then perhaps we can facilitate a
better integration for all of us as lawyers and as
human beings. So thank you all for being here.
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